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1 The International Labor Organization ("ILO") was established by the 
Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, pt. XIII, 225 Consol. T.R. 188, 112 B.F.S.P. 
1, amended on several occasions and current revision reprimed m, CONSTI­
TUTION Of THE INTERNP.TIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION AND STANDING 
ORDERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE 3-23 (1963) 
[hereinafter Treaty of Versailles]. The Preamble of the ILO Constitution ex­
pressly discusses one possible link between trade and labor. It reads,"[';v]hereas 
also t lle failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obsta­
cle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their 
own countries .... "Treaty of Versailles, pmbl. 
2 The Havana Charter, which established the International Trade Organi-
zation ("ITO") recognized that: 
[AJll countries have a common interest in the achievement and main­
tenance of fair labour standards related to productivity, and thus in the 
improvement of wages and working conditions as productivity may 
permir. The Members recognize that unfair labour conditions, par­
ticularly ... for export, create difficulties in international trade, and, 
accordingiy, each Member shall take whatever action may be appro­
priate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory. 
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
0RGANlZATION 32 (1948), Pub. No. 3206. 
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portant because calls for examining linkage have often been accom­
panied by calls for the negotiation of new international rules to be 
overseen by the \f./ orld Trade Organization. Studying linkage now 
may ,  therefore, help to explore how the world's operating trading 
system operates, and spur,  if necessary or timely, the development 
of additional international rules. 
The addition of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
("TRIPS")3 and Trade-Related Investment Measures ("TRH!IS")4 
Agreements to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as 
amended in 1994 ("GATT 1994") the formatio� of the 'VITO 
\YJ or king GroiJps on Environment and Investment) and the battle 
The Havana Charter also contains provisions related to investment. The 
Charter recognized that "international investment, both public and private, can 
be of great value in promoting economic development and reconstruction, and 
consequent social progress." !d. at 35 .  A signatory country was to pledge not to 
"take unreasonabl.� or unjustifiable action within its territory injurious to the 
rights or interests of nationals of other Members in the enterprise, skill, capital, 
arts or technology which they have supplied." !d. at 34. Nevertheless, the 
Charter did reserve rights of a signatory to "prescribe and give effect on just 
terms to requirements as to the ownership of existing and future investments." 
!d. at 35 .  The Charter was never ratified and, therefore, the ITO never came 
into existence. Instead, the international community signed and ratified the 
limited oortion of the charter that dealt with trade, which was the General 
Agreem�nt on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61  Stat. A-3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
For further information on the ITO, see William Diebold, Jr., The End of 
the I TO, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (No. 16,  1952); Jacob Viner, 
Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter, 25 FOREIGN AFF . 612 (1947); 
CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE (1949) . 
3 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
April 15 ,  1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza­
tion (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; Annex 1 C, LEGAL INSTRU1v1ENTS­
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 8 1  (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]. 
4 See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1 994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 2, 33 I.L.M. 
1244 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement]. 
5 The World Trade Organization has confronted the push of some of its 
Member states for increased linkage by establishing working groups to examine 
the relationship between trade and environment as well as trade and invest­
ment. See Steve Charnovitz, A Critical Guide to the WTO's Re-port on Trade and 
Environment, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 341 (1997) (discussing the efforts of 
the Working Group on Trade and the Environment). The Work.ing Group on 
the Relationship of Trade and Investment held its first meeting in June 1997. 
At the first meeting, the Group identified a checklist of issues it would pursue 
in its future work: I. Implications of the relationship between trade and in­
vestment for development and economic growth ... ; II. The economic rela-
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over linkage preceding and during the WTO's first lVIinisterial 
Meeting6 reveal that the multilateral body which creates and en-
tionship between trade and investment .. . ; III . Stocktaking and analysis of 
existing international instruments and activities regarding trade and mvest­
ment ... . WORLD TRADE ORG. , The Growing Impact of Jm>estment and Trade, 
Focus Qune-July 1997) at 2. 
The goals of the working oarty are to identify: (1) commo n  features and 
differences . . . as well as poss1ble gaps in existing international instruments; (2) 
advantages and disadvantages of entering into bilateral, regional and multilateral 
rules on investment, including from a development p -::rspective ; (3) the rights 
and obligations of home and host countries and of investors and host countries; 
and (4) the relationship between existi ng and possible future international co­
operation on investment policy and existing and possible future international 
cooperation on competition policy. See id. 
6 The \Y/TO's first 1v1inisterial Meeting was held in Singapore in December 
of 1 996. The developing countries, with suoport from some developed coun­
tries, includin? the United Kingdom, blocked efforts by the United States to get 
the issue of the relationship between trade and labor standards on the work 
agenda of the WTO .  The argument against inclusion of trade and labor stan­
dards in the WTO's work was that the lack of high standards would lead some 
developed countries to seek imposition of trade sanctions. See Gary G. Yerkey, 
Developing Countries Block US. Plan to Include Labor Issue in Work Agenda, 13 
Int'l Trade Rep .  (BNA) 1925 (Dec. 11, 1996). 
At the end of the Singapore meeting, a Ministerial Declaration was issued 
which contained the following statement about labor standards : 
\Y/ e renew our commitment to the observance of internationally 
recognized core labour standards. The International Labour Or­
ganization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal with these 
standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting 
them. We believe that economic growth and development fos­
tered by increased trade and further trade liberalization contribute 
to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labour 
standards for protectionist purposes , and agree that the compara­
tive advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing 
countries, must in no way be put into question .  In this regard, we 
note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their exist­
ing collaboration. 
Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996, 36 I .L.M. 220, 22 1 .  This por­
tion of the Ministerial Declaration closely follows the four points for labor 
consensus that had been suggested by \Y/TO Director-General, Renato Rug­
giero, at the beginning of the meeting. Those four points were as follows: 
1. All WTO member nations oppose abusive work place practices, 
through their approval of the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; 
2. The ILO holds primary responsibility for labor issues; 
3. Trade sanctions should not be used to deal with disputes over labor 
standards; and 
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forces trade rules has begun to recognize and accept son1e linkages. 
Activities in other organizations further illustrate the imer�st of the 
international community in linkage and rule-making. For example) 
ILO, energized by the trade-linka�e debate, has been rethinking its 
approach to fostering labor rights. Member states of the Orga..11iza-
t�. Member states agree that the compar,nive advantage of low-v..rage 
countries should not be compromised. 
WTO /"vlinisters Reach Consensus on Labor, Investment. Procuremer:t, Int' I Trade 
Daily, (BNA) (Dec .  ! 3, 1996). 
' See Brian A. Langille, Eight Ways to Think: about !ntcmatrona! L<bour 
Standards, 31 J . WORLD TRADE 27, 49 (1997) (discussing linkag,e, :,nd how a 
move to the WTO led to a refocusing on the Intemationa.1. Labor Organization 
and its operations, and to th:lt group �efocusing its effor-ts). � 
Even before the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, the ILO bd set up a 
working party to discuss how it should respond to demands to link labor and 
trade. D�scussions on the linkage were first held by the ILO Governing Body 
in 1994. See Virginia A. Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade: The So� 
cia! Clause (GAIT, fLO, NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HAR� 
MONIZATION 177, 190 Gagdish Bhagwat i & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). Prior 
to that discussion, the ILO Director-General, Michel Hansenne, had written 
about linkage in his 1994 Annual Report to the ILO Labour Co nference. See 
Report of the Director� General : Defending Values Promoting Change-Social 
Justice in a Global Economy, INTERNATIONAL LABOR 0RG., International 
Labor Conference, 81st Sess. (1994). The Director-Genel·al expressed concerns 
about the use of a social clause that allowed trade sanctions to be used in re­
sponse to substandard labor conditions, and suggested possible ILO responses. 
Id. at 58-60. After the 1994 Governing Body meeting, a working party was set 
up to discuss all aspects of the social dimension of the liberalizJ.tion of trade. 
The ILO Office produced for that working party a working paper entidedThe 
Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of World Trade, International Labour Of­
fice, Governing Body, 261st Sess . ,  ILO Doc. GB. 261/WP/SLD/1 (1994). The 
ILO Office Report discussed several ways in which social issues could be dealt 
with in the GATT /WTO framework: 
(1) considering abnormally low social conditions to be a subsidy under 
Article XVI of the GATT; (2) extending the General Exceptions arti­
cle of the GATT (Art . XX) to cover workers' rights; (3) through use o f  
the GATT art. XXIII dispute settlement proviswn's concepts of nulli­
fication and impairment. 
See Leary, supra note 7, at 193-94 (describing the Social Dimensions Report). 
The Social Dimensions Report was never acted upon. 
Following the Singapore Ministerial Meeting, the ILO again refocused on 
the linkage between trade and labor. The 1997 Director-General's Repo rt also 
questions how the ILO should  deal with the social dimensions of �lobalization. 
Report of the Director-General: The ILO, Standard Setting, and Globabliza­
tion, International Labor Org. , International Labor Conference, 85th Sess. 
(1997) [hereinafter 1997 Director-General Report]. During the 1997 Interna­
tional Labor Conference, Director-General Hansenne tried to get the Organiza­
tion to establish a program on the relationship between trade and labor rights. 
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tion for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") are 
in what is supposed to be the final stages of negotiations on the 
Multilateral i\greement on Investment ("MAI"). 8 c ' "l' k d" d h . d 1 1 Some m the areas . m .e to tra e ave gamer ru es ana en-
forcernent mechanisms for them (i.e., trade--related intellectual 
• 1 \ I 1 1' , f d . - 1 property ngnts). n otner areas, mKage as a · oun atwn ior n11e-
, - ' ' 1 l'b , . ' ' . \9 m8.Kmg t1as ceen more ae 1• erate (Le., trade and mvestrnent) or 
. . ' ,_ . • (' d d ' b . h ) 10 'V!' h ., . .I heavily res1sced ,Le., tra e an la or ng ts . why 1. ave some lmK-
-------· -- --- - ----- -- -
The devel opi n � ccuEtries strongly resisted some of the S\l��;:escions made in the ' - ., . .. '-'...  1, r . J ' ' h ' .._...,___. ...-l99! :..)lrt:ctor-Crenen. s Report, part:cu any tnat t ere De some new 1LO su-
perviscry mech::wism to assess Member State complianc:e '.vith rhe mand�nes of 
' �. u-, r 
. 
d 1 " . I 1 b 1' " . ' ( ' L the lL · ._.cnvenuons an vo untary SOC!a a e mg or proaucts to snow tJ!t: products --;;,ere made under adequate labor condit io ns) . See John Parri, United 
States Sztpports fLO 0/final's Cal! for Linking Trade and Labor StandArds, Int ' l  
Tnde D�dy (BNi\.) June 13, 1997). The ILO Governing Body has put the is­
sue of core labor standards on the agenda for the 1998 International Labor Con-
' u  � - �  s' ;,?{, � ---r 1•1 r,_renLc.. Ee '·"Jra ><uce " . 
3 The current status of MAI negotiations and any ultimate agreement is 
unclear. The OECD member states have issued the February 14, 1998 draft of 
the IviAL The 1v1AI Negotiating Text, as  it is referred to,  was made public by 
its posting on the OECD home page. A proviso on the cover page states that 
"[t]he text reproduced here results mainly from the work of expert groups and 
has not yet been adopted by the MAl Negotiating Group." MAl Negotiating Text, (lvailab!e at MAl TEXT (visited Feb. 14, 1998) <http:! /www .oecd. 
org/dafi cmis/mail/.tviAlTEXT >PDF>. During the Febnnry meeting of the 
OECD States, the United States argued that the MAI will not be ready for 
submission to the membership in April 1998, which is the deadline for the 
IvlAI. See US. Negotiators See No Chance of Signing MAl at OECD April Ministe­
rial, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 251 (Feb. 18, 1998). 
9 The linkage of trade and investment has proven difficult in the 
GATT /WTO system. The Uruguay Round did adopt two agreements which 
cover some aspects of investment: the TRIMS Agreement and the GATS 
Agreement . See Bernard Hockman, General Agreement on Trade in Services, in 
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS 177 (1994) ; Joseph W.P. Wong, 
Overview of TRIPS, Services and TRIMS, in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: 
fEADINGS l73 (1994) . 
Nevertheless, it is clear that neither the TRIMS nor the GATS represents a 
full treatment of investment rights and protections. This is made obvious by 
the fa�t that _the WTO ?e�ide? to take ':lP the issue of _investment again at  the 
end ot the Smgapore Mmtstenal by settmg up a Workmg Party on Trade and 
Investment. See supra note 5. 
10 The gap between the views, of the developing and developed countries 
over the need for or value of linking trade with labor, has remained wide since 
the United States got the issue on the agenda for the WTO's first Ministerial 
Meeting. The setback of the United States on this issue during the 1996 Minis­
terial Meeting, has consigned the issue to the lLO. See supra note 5. Given the 
ILO's most recent discussions on trade and labor, however, it is unclear what 
will occur in that organization. At the conclusion of the International Labor 
Conference in June 1997, the ILO displeased both developing and developed 
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ages been more readily accepted and acted upon by th{� interna­
tional community than others? This Article will attempt to J.rrive 
at some answers by examining both trade and investment) and trade 
and labor from several different perspectives. 
First, this Article will. attempt to explain why linkage does not 
play out the same for both trade and investment and trade and la­
bor. The first section will examine the essential nac.;re of invest­
ment rights and labor rights, along with the implications of this 
analysis for linkage as ·well as how investment and labor ri;�hts re­
late to trade. Second. this Article will analyze the currenr orocess 
of multilateral trade -and trade-re!?.ted rule-making11 ;•nd o�f-fer an 
• . r h rl • d . ' ' �t ' - ' analys1s or w. at tra._L e-relate mvestment ana la 10r ruJes mtgh-r 
look like. Finally, this Article will discuss what would be achieved 
and who would
, 
gain if trade-related investment and kb:x rules 
were negotiated and adopted. 
countries by leaving the l inkage issue on its agenda without specifying wh2t 
would be done. See John Parry, fLO Balks at Trade, Labor R ights Lin�; U.S. May 
Press Harder, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (June 24, 1997) . 
The Asian governments and unions which oppose the linkage concept have 
asked that the United States and other developed countries refrain from oush­
ing the linkage of trade and core labor standards at either the ILO or 'YITO un­
til there is consensus between the groups of nations. See Eileen Drage O'Reilly, 
Asian Governments, Un ions Oppose Linkage Between Trade, Labor Stand:nds, 
lnt'l Trade Daily (BNA) (July 2, 1997). 
In November 1997, the ILO's Governing Body decided to put a 
"declaration of principle" concerning fundamental workers' rights on the 
agenda of the June 1998 International Labor Conference. The proposal will in­
clude an ILO "follow-up" mechanism that would allow the organization to re­
view whether countries are in compliance with seven core labor standards 
which cover freedom of association and collective bargaining, forced labor, non­
discrimination and minimum age for employment. See Eileen Drage O'Reilly, 
Singapore Minister Urges Asian Nations to Reject fLO Proposal on Core Standards, 
BNA Int'l Trade Daily, Dec. 1 5 ,  1997 [heremafter Singapore Afinister Urges]. 
Although Asian nations remain opposed to the ILO's efforts, the United 
States has taken the position that the ILO will not be a credible institution if it 
fails to adopt the declaration and a follow-up mechanism.  See Pamela M. Prah, 
Opponents of Labor Standards Declaration Feed Protectionism, U.S. Tells Asian 
Nations, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Dec. 15, 1997) . 
11 The approach taken towards examining the process of multilateral rule­
making is not based on any scheme of international rule-making. Rather, it is 
based upon a review of how trade-related rules have recently been negotiated in 
the WTO. See supra Section 2.1. (discussing what may be the theoretical un­
derpinnings for th1s approach). 
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1. LINKAGE OBSERVED: WHY LINKAGE Is NOT ALWAYS THE 
SAME 
1.1. Unpacking the Linkage 
Both investment and labor are part of trade; each is a factor of 
production. Yet an examination of how the world perceives the 
linking of investment and labor rights to trade reveals chat linkage 
does not always succeed by fully considering and negotiating new 
rules are f�lly consi�ered or negotiate?. In the .
case ?f b;bo:� �igh1T� 
for examo1e, trade lmka�e has been flrmly reststed m t11e ·v(1TO 
d 1 � • ' .'-" 1 1 'f 11 . h -L" 13 'T'' 1· ' an snows s1gns or movmg s ow y, 1 at a , m L e 1 u. _.he mk-
ing of trade and investmem was turned back or truncated in the 
GATT, 14 accepted for study at the \Y/T01s and is actively being 
12 See supra note 6 (discussing how linkage between trade and labor rights 
was left at the WTO) . 
13 See supra notes 8 and 11 (discussing the ILO's efforts regarding linkage) . 
14 The "turning back" is a reference to the fate of the TRIMS Avreement . 
Before the Uruguay Round, the United States pushed for a compreh�nsive set 
of rules on investment. See Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy, III, Agreement 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures (JRIMS): Limitations and Prospects for the 
Future, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGIS­
LATION 447 (f erence P. Stewart ed. ,  1996) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TRADE 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY]. 
According to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1 988, which, 
after The Round, began to set out the negotiating objectives for investment, the 
focus was to be as follows: (1) reducing and eliminating artificial or trade dis­
torting barriers to investment; (2) expanding the concept of national treatment; 
(3) reducing unreasonable barriers to the establishment of investment; and (4) 
developing rules, including dispute settlement procedures. See Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 104-418, Sect . 1101(b)(11), 102 Stat . 1107, 
1124. 
The TRIMS negotiations proved difficult to get on the Uruguay Round 
agenda. See generally Carl W. Schwarza & Bennett A. Caplan, Trade Related 
Investment Measures (JRIMS): Scrutiny in the GATT and Implications for Socialist 
Countries, 11 HASTINGS lNT'L & COMP. L. REV. 55 (1987). The Ministerial 
Declaration for the Uruguay Round provided for discussion on the "trade re­
strictive and distorting effects" of trade-related investment measures. See Uru­
guay Round Ministerial Declaration, Sept. 20, 1986, GATT B.I .S.D. (33rd 
Supp.) at 19 (1987). 
From the beginning, the United States' agenda, as demanded in the round, 
was completely different from that of the developing countries. See Trade­
Related Investment Measures, in 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND : A NE­
GOTIA11NG HISTORY (1986-1992) 2001, 2073 (ference P. Stewart ed. , 1993) 
(describing the developed countries as seeking a new regime which would pro­
hibit certain behavior of governments towards investment, versus the deve1op-
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pursued by the OECD. i b  The difference in  the t reatment of trade 
linkage regarding the two areas seems to spring from two sources: 
the nature of investment and labor rights and their varying degrees 
of trade-relatedness . 
1. 1 . 1 .  Examination of the Nature and Reality of Jn·vestment 
R ights and Labor R ights 
Tt ,- ' h . . 1 • ne response or gov�rnments ane1 t11e mternatron<11  cornmuruty 
to labor and investment (and the rights that com_e from each) , as 
' 1  d l '  . 1 l . . , ' ' . ··c we1 as any t ra · e  1 nkage, appears t o  De Llctatec_1 oy �ne cili1erences 
. h . . h '.vr · r . ,  • I - . • m t e1r 1n. erent nnu res.  w hat to.lwws rs a ae.scn ouve and corn-. [ r [ . ' h . . ;' "I 1 1 • paratlve cata. ogue ot c 1e essent1a1 C b aract e n s ocs or i3. D o r  anc1 Ln.-
vestment, accompanied by a comment2.ry on ho·,;;;,r e0.ch relates to 
trade. 
Caoital is a factor of vroduction. Canita l is a v ropertv which is  l l,. L A . .I 
a commodity under the control of  persons. Capital, and invest-
ment as a use of this orooertv, exists because le0>='"al systems created a 1. .1.. ,/ 
medium of exchange and then dictated its uses. Investment ey_ists 
when capital is devoted to a purpose. The trade-related aspect of 
investment is its contribution to the creation of goods and services 
that are traded. 17 
ing countries which wanted to limit TRI1v1S negotiarions to an elaboration of 
ex1sting GATT articles that would be accompanied by an "effects" test to de­
termine whether an activity was covered by the agreement) . The TRllviS 
A�reement that came out ot the Uruguay Round was not exactly what the de­
veloped or developing countries sought; however, it is closer to the latter 's 
views. The TRThtiS Agreement, Article 2, is based around a listing of the in­
vestment measures which are prohibi ted because they violate Articles III 
(National Treatment) and XI (Prohibition o n  Quantitative Restrictions) of the 
GATT. See TRIMS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 2. 
The truncation refers to the GATS A&!:eement which covers only one J.s­
pect of investment, the right to establish . 1 he GATS had to reach this invest­
ment issue because commercial presence was recognized by the agreement as 
one of the four modes by which services are traded. See General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, Apr. 15 ,  1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establ ishing the WTO, 
Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 
3 1 , 33 I.L.M. 142 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
15 See supra note 5 (describing the WTO Working Party on Trade and In­
vestment) . 
16 See supra note 8 (discussing the MAl). 
17 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Factors Influencing the Flow of Foreign Invest­
ment and the Relevance of a Multilateral Gum·antee Scheme, 22 INT'L LAW. 671,  
675 (1987) (pointing out that foreign direct investment provides "an integrated 
package of financial resources, managerial skills, technical knowledge and mar­
keting connections") . 
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Labor is a factor  of production.  Yet, the international labor 
community has frequently reiterated that " labor is not a commod-18 I 1 d . r 1 ff . , l. , . J 1 ity. " �aoor enves rom t 1e e oris ot n uman bemgs anu, tnere-
fore,  implicates human dignity. Unlike capital (and investment) 
human beings and their efforts exist beyond commerce and legal 
systems . . . . h . . 1 1 I .  1 • L1rmtmg t e companson between " a o o r  ;:me. mvestment to tms 
1 .. f 
h 1 1 , . 1 1 eve l ,  may suggest some o t e reasons wny t racie l in Kage provoKes . . f - TL . 1 , , 1 • l c 0 d1 terent responses.  ne trade and tracie-relatccl ru es 01 the 
G � --r·� ' "'" \.,. ' '�""" � 1 i · � · 1 ]_A. 1 L / W 1 '-' system as tney cu rre ntly e x1s·,� can o e  ·,ne wea as re-' . . r . ' 1 1 "  . sponses Cl. rl Cl p rescnptlOnS IOf tCOTIOr:1 l C  c\ll G governrnental po lCl.CS 
concerning the commodities,  services or p roperty rights that are 
part of or an: related to trade . For exar:n pl ·c: ,  Ehe core rules of the 
Go� � r, l  A �r pa. ... T· ;±-!s r -1 �T\ , ... �) (� 0 (1---::_ t\ ;-rT '' 1 0.�·7") 1 t1 C> �...uer"'' " ' c/ �'�menc  on " a L  1 anu 1 .  -. · - ·� \ 'J rl.. ·' .�. ·' / ,  . seeK . n._ 
. , . h  1 • • f l . 1 l , . . . r d "  progresstve I l L  e rallzatlon o trac e 1n gooc.s ana elm11nJl1on o ,_ ts-. . . . h d 19 Th G , ,\ rf , . cnm1nat10n 1n t1 at tra e . e eneral h.. greement on raGe 111 
0 ("G T"") 0 d d I f. 0 • l "f "  ,..) f Services A �) 1s evote to ae mwg the m�±erent rnoues o 
supply for the services that exist i n  commerce and the liberalizing 
of ser1ices trade.20 The TRIPS of GATT 1994 was negotiated to 
1 8  The ILO adopted this A merican Federation of Labor (" AFL") motto as a 
basic principle of the organization during its early histor;.  See generally THE 
ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR 0RGANTZATIC?N (james T. Shotwell 
ed. , 1 934) . The 1997 Director-General , reporting on a tinancial expe rt 's com­
ments that social j ustice cannot be achieved throu_gh unrestrained comoetition in the market, noted that "[t]hese words are very close to the ILO's basic tenet: 
labour is not a commodity. Even if it were proved that child labour brings 
economic advantages to those resorting to it, it must still be abhorred by any­
one with a healthy conscience."  See 1997 Director-General Report, supra note 
7, at 5. 
19 See GATT, supra note 2, art . II (discussincr tariff binding which provides 
for countries to lower tariffs and bind them.) .  T1e lowering and binding o f  tar­
iffs have been a crucial part of the eight negotiating rounds of the 
GATT/WTO .  
20 See GATS, supra note 14, arts.  I (on defining the rnodes of sui?ply) ,  XVI, XVII, XVIII (dealing with market access, National Treatment and additional 
commitments which explain the limitations that countries were allowed to 
make on the schedules that represented their service commitments) . 
Specific commitments are scheduled by modes of supply and apply 
only to listed service sectors and subsectors (that is, a positive-list ap­
proach was taken towards sectoral coverage) , subject to sector-specific 
qualifications, conditions and limitations that may continue to be 
maintained, either across all modes of supply or for a specific mode 
(that is, a negative-list approach for policies that violate national treat­
ment or market access) . 
Hoekman, supra note 9 at 178. 
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create minimum }evels of intel lectual property rights protection 
and enforcemem.- 1 In the case of intellectual property rights, the 
. 11 1 I d 1 f . . . , 1 h . o wn e r  1s a wwea to exc u e otners rom actrv!t t�s re.tatc:c to t e1r 
h d f h · · · 22 1 , ' • h property, t e pro ucts o t . err mmd, ana tnen::by, gam t e trtle 
value of that property. The trade-relatedness of intellectual prop-
. . r h . . . 1 1 . h . en:y ngrns stems rrom t etr extstence as esse n ;: 1 �u e .emem:s m t1 e m-. . 1 . f h 1 73 t.ernauona trade o tee no ogy.-
, .  . h d . r j l  . ' . ' • . I' . 1nvest m e nr: ng ts an protections ra .. 1 vnt tt m  t11e ambit or exist-
; ., 1- - ....,d .-. - , r1 � .--.. d l r d 1 T � • c -. ·:- ,,..... � rr �· ; -;- � '2 -:· � .. .o O •""l."""" c-. 1  c1.g � r �' e <trc .. .. r « e re ace ru_ e s .  1.n 1est rr., ,_ tH .• .. 6, , ,. .) a1 � cr .... "'� ... a 
1 ' 1 1  [ . . . . ·w ne n  a coun.try ctwoses to a, o w  wre1gn m. 'I':'s t o rs 1 nro 1ts eco-
. r l ') fY � �'""' .. , . � .(:.l r.-">j !-v·; r o - ..... . ha . h j p- �1 "  r. !:o :":'·;- ,"<, h i ; � >i · ;- h .a. ;;·---, r a 1 � .  r,; . l .1 . . .... .. ,.\ .• •,. "/SL -... . l . u J brctntlng t .... m L e r - 6 - '·t [ v '-'·' , .; ..... . , . ... . , '-· c ... � ·.-ll .h> C l v eJ l f.. ' ' . 1 d/ 1 1 the: r-.narket and co contro an , or_own assets t procuce goco.s or 
• Y • 2) I ' 1 > se�cv1.ce.s . lD'ieSt.me n.t orotecttOI1S are aes1�nect rxy gcfver.rlln·=nts to 
!. v � '-·' 
J \ s �-RTTV' \ 1 IT 0 .. � ' • h b - ee 1 -�· ::, f greement, supra note J ,  pt. . 1, <lrts .  7 - Y-; \sectmg o ui. t e su -
scantive minirnum standards for the intellectual property rights recogrrized by 
the agre·�ment, which include: copyright, tradem a r ks , patents, geographical in­
dicators,, layout designs of_ integr�ted c�rcuits, protection. of .. c:ndisclosed infor­matiOn \trade secrets} and mdustnal des1gns) . Part III of the 1 RIPS Agreement 
contains provisions regarding the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
such as , civil and administrative procedures, p rovision�J. and final remedies, 
criminal penalties, and border enforcement. See id. arts . 41-61 . 
22 Se�' Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Conve�gen ce ofNMional ln­
tel!Extual Proper-ty Norms in International Trading Ag-l'eernents, 1 2  AM. U. J .  
INT'L L. & POL'Y 769, 772 ( 1997) . 
23 According to Jagdish Bhagwat i ,  "[R]ules about intellec�ual property pro­
tect ion ·while different m essential respects in economic logic !rom those regard­
ing trade, do have some essential trade aspects: the transfer and diffusion of 
technology, and payments for the same, across countries can be legitimately 
viewed as international trade in technology . . . . " j ;:;gdish Bhagwati ,Policy Per· 
spectives and Future Directions: A View jrom A cademi<<, in INTERNATIONAL 
LABOR STANDARDS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRAll: ON: PROCEEDINGS 
OF A SYMPOSIUM 57-58 (Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs, U.S.  Dept. of Labor, eels . , 1994) [ hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LABOR ST ANDAIZDS]. 
l-\ Investment rights are those which allo'fl the investrflent to exist in the 
first place, such as the right to establish, own and control .  The GATS covers 
investment because one of the modes for the supply of services is commercial 
presence establishment. See GATS , supra note 14,  art . I, 2 (c) . In the !viAl draft 
text, these rights are combined with the crucial standards of national treatment 
and most-favored nation ("MFN") treatment . See _A,i,4l Negotiating Text, supra 
note 8 ,  art. 3 (1) (setting forth the national treatment standard) , and art. 3 (2) 
(setting forth the MFN standard) . 
25 - . " 11 d d f ' . lnvesiment protect1ons are genera y eeme necessary or tne creatwn 
of a favourable investment climate," and include provisions on oovernment 
rneasures, such as expropriation, which could cause the investor to 1ose most if 
not all of the investment and other measures, such as limits on the repatriation 
of funds, which could cause disruption in an investment. UNITED NATIONS 
CON1�ERENCE ON TR.\DE AND DEVELOPMENT ("TJl'JCTAD") , WORLD 
11,/1/ESTMENT REPORT 1996: l:t'J.VESTMENT, TR..A.DE AND INTERNATIONAL 
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secure the continuing existence of or non-interference ·with the 
property rights obtained through investment activity. The creation 
and recognition of international investment rights and protections, 
thp,· afo �·e -�01 " ; 11·,- :::�.,.e.;: inte �r· ·' '" l. onal r ··.-,de .,_ ,( ....... A ) .!.. (.<..\.,.,_,. �r:.�l. -... - . .J. J. a.. \... - A. 0. • 
By contrast; the usual focus in a discussion of labor rights is on 
the human hcwr. There is emphasis on the premise that labor 
. ' - 1 . I 76 L ' . ] ' nghts are an. aspect ot nurnan ngnts. - abor .ts not a cornmo mty 
b .....,, ... , .. cc.. r· ...... . c:. - � ---· · r-�.:: • ..-...C ... "1 ... ("'� '::'1 r' .., t �-z t ;  • T 1 d  ...... J o--- p-"""1 1 • ·; .- ...-. :r. cl .. :"-'·Y- c. . .__ ,_., _ p .. a. n·- ·-- v _, ::, �.-; __ n c. �nar a.C e. 1 a . o n  w ou. .._,..__ l l! � an D. L<,r:k.d 
� :  :r- : .-..... . -i. J ;  � -,-.. �; -r. cr L- 1, .-,_ ; i..-. ·r ,.., � 1 --<.r : n - h . ,... � , P . ---- 1 ·'"" � {C ,J. •. :. __ , u  . .  ; . ., . < :::: :,· . d. �, !. ct u v r  r,g • .  t •• :o OE1; i d  L . .. l.� way, n o •;v  � ver, '- "'- '-:, o _,_ " 
n:t;s:� <�c;v::ie- relat;::�l dialogue. Labor rights, so viewed, must be pee-· 
tecred b 'i . .. sysu::rn which focuses on the uniaue natur2 of dy:=: 
right:,: . 27 • 
POLICY f\RRAI'../GEMEI'-JTS 1 89 ,  1 90 ( 1996) [herein<�.fter 1996 \YI ORLD IN­
VESTMENT REPORT]. No WTO agreement currently covers investment protec­
tiOns. 
The lVlAI draft text has provisions listed under Section IV, Investment Pro­
tect ion.  Those provisions include: General Treatment (IV, 1 .) (Contracting 
Parties are to accord investments and investors "fair and equitable treatment 
and full and constant pr?tection and security") ; Expro,eriation and Compensa­tion (IV, 2 .) ;  Protection trom Strife (IV, 3 .) ;  Transfers (IV, 4 .) (Contracting Par­
ties are to "ensure that all rayments relating to an investment in its t erritory ' ' . 
may be freely transferred 111 and out of its territory without delay . ") .  JI!A ! Ne­
gotiating Text, supra n o t e  8 ,  at 57. 
'lb .,.. . , 1 h 1 h • I , ' · .t here 1s genera agreement among sc o ars t at core laoor ngt1ts are �; 
part of human rights. See Langille, supra note 7, at 34 (discuss ing the i mpor­tance of defining a core l ist of labor nghts and not simply loo king at all labor 
standards, because if they are rights, they cannot b e  taken away) ; see aLso Steve 
Charnovitz, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and 
Recent Developments in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate, 1 1  TEMP. INT'L 
& COMP. LJ . 1 3 1  (1997) . According to Charnovitz, it is important to argue that the best motive for international labor law is based upon altruism, with the 
goal of  raising iabor conditions in  all countries. Of all the motivations , includ­
mg commeroal concerns and domestic welfare, "[t]he altruistic motivation is 
the most compelling of the three motivations since it interweaves labor stan­
?ards int? the lar�er framework, of human rights ."  !d. at 1 59 ;  see aLso Virginia A. Leary, The Paradox of Workers Rzghts as Human R zghts, m HUMAN RIGHTS, 
LABOR FJGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 22 (Lance A. Compa &: Step hen 
F. Diamond eds . ,  1996) (stating that "workers' rights are human rights, yet the 
international human rights movement devotes l ittle time to the rights of work­
ers . . .  [a] regrettable paradox: the human rights movement and the labor 
movement nm on tracks that are sometimes parallel and rarely meet") . 
27 This argument is frequently made t o  explain why the ILO is the interna­
tional institution most caoable o f  dealing with labor rights. See Charnovitz, 
supra note 26, at 160-63 (observing that ILO is better suited than WTO to deal 
wnh the labor rights issue,  although ILO needs to extend its powers); Langille, 
supra note 7, at 49-50 (asserting that the ILO cannot simply rely on its history 
and record of accomplishment, but rather needs t o  dec1de what w do about 
r . ) .mkd.ge . 
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A reconceptualization of labor rights may be necessary ,  there-­
fore, if there is ever to be a useful trade-related discussion of these 
rights. A useful alternative description would involve seeing labor 
rights, like investment rights, as necessary for the creat ion of a type 
f 18 T' · 1 • l , · h h , 1 1 1 o property.- . 11ose ent1t1ed to . aoor ng ts s ou1a oe seen as nav-. . L • ! 1 r h . fr S 1 mg a property ngnt m tne proauct ot t e1r e orts. . ucn a recon-1 .  • 1 ' ' ' 1 • J ., 1 I ceptua.1zat10E nuKes the recogn1t10n ano protectwn o,  · co re �aoc;r 
• - ,  "79 • ' I ' ' ' j l  1 1 ngnts, - as rel ies devoted to ensunng m1mma<ty acceptab.e stan-
dards for the cxploiring of these property rights, more closely akin 
• ' . ' l  ' . b 30 c h l to mvestrnent arJ•j Hltel1ectua1 property ng ... ts . •nee sue ana o -
. . . ' 1 . � - · 1 1 h . . 1 g1es are drawn,  tt t'ecomes ut±1cu.t to argue tnz.t L e 1 nternat10nar 
-l . 1 • • l b 1 ·� d. . 1 t raue commun n.y n 2_s nc Elterest m a or rutes . .t.xpan mg t ne tra-
ditional unders::anding of labor rights to include their consideration 
. r • 1 1 1 d h I as '� fO�'ert · n n ·- · or �  " '·Op"'rt'y· r·• crnt W 0 ' 1  , ,  n nt ' ' il  e r�·ut t e n ·u ··x·, �, ,.., .(-' ..... ""' 1 ·.._. .�.  ... .,:, l a. _rr J. \_. ! b  ._ .. � �  . u  .... a_... �. ........ J .i.  1 . .l OJ.. ! 
rights view. Rather than demeaning the nature of labor, a property 
rights description captures the role labor plays i n  the commercial 
world. Defining core labor rights would also establish the limits 
that must be placed o n  government 's restrictions of these property 
rights for human dignity to be ensured. 
Other large differences between i nvestment and labor  rights af­
fect how each area relates to  trade . The capital of  i nvestment is in­
herently mobile.3 1 Capital can be transferred easily if a currency is 
freely convertible. The restrictions that exist on this inherent mo­
bility come from government regulation aimed at restricting, at­
tracting and retaining capital o r  by the market value of the inves�­
ment . Labor, by contrast , is more l ikely to be less mobile.)2 
2 8  The suggestion for this rethinking of the nature of labor rights came 
fro� a question posed during the IELIG Linkages Conference by Steve Char­
novnz. 
29 Recent academic l iterature and other studies on labor rights have made a 
distinction between core labor rights and labor standards. See supranote 7, for 
the universe of core rights identified by the Director-General of the ILO, and 
infra notes 78 and 87 for those identified by the OECD. 
30 The reconceptualization is not that drastic a step to take. It is common­
place to talk about intellectual property, which simply is a legal characteriza­
tion of the creative work product of individuals. 
31 See generally WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1 995 : 
WOR](ERS IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 61  (1995) ("[O]ne fact is indisputable: 
capital crosses borders more easily than labor and despite the bes t  efforts of na­
tional governments to control i t . ") [hereinafter 1995 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT] . 
32 Labor is currentiy less mobile than capital . See id. at 62. This was not 
always the case. According to Rodrik, "[R]estrictions on immigration were not 
as common during the 19th century, and consequently labor's international 
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People tend to Eve and work in their own countries because their 
• I . r· . . ' 33 h . . f market va ue 1s ow, i: hey choose to ao so, or  t1 e1r opt1ons or  ex-
iting an� working in another country are limited by government 
• j4 . . h ' . d . f h . 1 1 polie1es. .A�ssur:nng t at ��er_e 151 a . eman� . or t e1r worK, wor�-ers frequently cnoose to nm1t tne1r mobtlny because econonuc 
goals are not their only considerations. Labor, as discussed earlier, 
. i l d ' 1 c ' ''! l cannc>t s1rrrp1\' oe ·ur1 ter.�r� o:.Jd. as ari e"'"ement 01 con1merce. \� orK, 
l ' -; . .  , h� · " .. - ,� r !"'l l\ ·y :· � ''"' ..., [ '' � ., p 1 ' � .�r � � � • ..,. • --f ...- r [ . wruch 1::; c .e l iO fl-._c,..ll _, .._.. L l J L  b<l.rne l \  .. d tn .. proacH .. �l v � actJ. nt v u1 l n-
. • •  1 1 J S  · · _ r " 1  · 1 r '  dr..rwuals, 1s a rnaj or com oonenL or tne socta structure or a cou n-· 
I . . . .  , ' ; . j . . 1 1 '  " 'd . ' try- 'X/orK 1s so Cf1JCl a i  Lo t lle ID(1rv1a�a · s  sense oi i er1t 1t�y, anc S() 
1 .  1 : • 1 ' ' l }b 1 1 j: J ; j ii1l�ect to a partJC ll a r S·:JC.te::·: .. -" s 'la tles, that \vor.r�ers 1requerrtt'v lo.l-
' 
. } 1 • • • E ' [ h .  � 
. 
low goals ot.1e:r t n a.n pure-ly econormc o n e s .  ven li t 1  1s 1s not t rue) 
• ' . .  • 1 . ' . • 
b 
. . . .  workers may De hrrutea w tneu ootwns ecause ottwr cou m n es ' 
• .c 
---�-·- ---------------------- ----
b . , .  ' 1 I r . 1 r- 1 h mo wty was rno1e comparat• J e  to t nat or capna. . \.... Onsequent y, L e Jsyrn.me-
try between mobi le capi tal (physical and human) and immobile ' natural ' b.bor, 
which characterizes the present situation, is a relatively recent phenomenon . " DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? 8 (Institute for Im'l 
Econ.  ed. ,  1 997) .  
3 3  There is a difference i n  labor mobility for certain portions of  the labor 
force. The globalization of the world economy has only intensified this. As 
Rodrik points out: 
[R]educed barriers to trade and investment accentuate the asymmetry 
between groups that can cross borders (either directly or indirectly, 
say, through ?ut sourcing) and_ thos� who cannot. In the first category 
are owners ot capital, highly skdlea workers, and many p rofessionals,  
who are free to take the1r resources where they are most in  demand. 
Unskilled and sem iskil led workers and most middle managers belong 
in the second category. 
RODRlK, supra note 32,  at 4. Not ali workers would relocate if they could. 
They choose to remain in their home country and work there because work is 
part of their social experience. See infra note 36. 
34 Immigration is treated differently by governments from other issues 
such as trade. Why do governments liberalize trade but manage migration? 
According to the World Bank, there are non-economic and economic reasons. 
The non-economic reason is that "large migrations disturb the way a society 
thinks of itself . . . . " 1995 World Development Report, supra note 3 1 ,  at 67. 
The economic reasons are that migrants would not necessarily move to enhance 
their p roductivity. Industrial countries with welfare states are afraid of attract­
ing too many migrants, and, therefore, admit them selectively "using instru­
ments ranging from visa restrictions and border controls to legislated criteria 
for admisswn. " !d. 
35 See RICHARD C. HALL, DIMENSIONS OF WORK 13 (1986) ("Work is the 
effort or activity of  an individm.l performed for the purpose of providing goods 
or services of value to others; it is also considered to be work by the individual 
so involved.") 
36 See generally Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 658, 682-83 (1996) .  
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immigration policies do not encourage their exit. 37 The c rucial dis­
tiiJ.ction between mobility for investment and labor has conse­
quences in any discussion about trade-relatedness and the need for 
international trade-related rule-making. Given capital 's  mobility, 
an international set of standards for investment would provide cer­
tainty for investors which would facilitate more investment and ul­
timately rnore trade. By contrasr, mobility of most workers ,  par-. j ' 1 • • • I b ' l ' f I � h l f 1 tlCu,.ar_\y t ne hmlteo mo wty o tnat part ot t e wor.--;-. orce tnat 
suffers most from low labor standards, means that their main con-
.,.., "' _..,. :  .. . , , . .  ; .� ) · h·  ; "' . ., l - , . · ,. , ; , - �  ah ,_ h  r ct'• -d c.. u . .t ,  ... L 'il1 ., � .. 1 t e , nr-.. rnatlon ... . com;rn .. DL)  .• � Llroub .. · .. e p. o uu .. s 
thev ;:>reduce for trade. The exist ing rules of the international trad-) -� 
ing regime, however, are not based on how goods are produced . 
y • 1 1 • • I ' ' [ 1 d • 1 lndeea U!.lS 1s one reason wny It IS r requent y argue that there 
should no-c be rules on trade-related labor  rights or  t hat we should 
not use trade sanctions to enforce compliance with such rights . 
The final difference between investment and labor  is  how each 
is shaped by market forces . Investment is highly responsive to 
market forces . Given its mobile character, investment would tend 
to How where it can obtain the best rate of return. Investment does 
not ±low freely, however, because governments often dictate limits 
as to its mobility, by either by limiting investment to certain indi-
'd . 33 ( 11 b f . 1 '  ) . . 39 v1 uals usua y ecause o nat1ona ny or mto certa1n sectors. 
Either for reasons of sovereignty or economics no government be-
1 .  . 1 f d f .  40 ueves m comp ete ree om o mvestment. 
Labor is affected, but not solely influenced, by market forces . 
Some governments resist labor rules, or develop certain kinds of 
} 7  See HALL, supra note 35. 
38  There are a wide variety of measures that governments can take to re­
strict investment that can be divided into categories. There are measures that 
restrict admission and establishment, those that restrict ownership and control, 
and those affecting how an investment operates. See 1996 WORLD IN­
VESTMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 174-78 for a comprehensive list of the dif­
ferent types of measures. A large number of these are aimed at protecting local 
producers. See i.d. at 175 .  
3 9  The reasons for restricting entry and ownership are that a country has 
made a decision about "the proper apportionment of resources between the 
public and private sectors;" as a result, some sectors may be closed to private 
emry or ownership altogether. See id. at 17 4 .  
, c  The best illustration for this comes in the form of the MAI itself. The 
cext of the agreement is attached to a long list of country specific exceptions 
that the Member states will be taking to MAI obliO"ations . No OECD Member 
State of the developed world wants a completely liberalized investment regime. 
See inFa Section 2 .2 .3 . and accompanying notes (discussing the MAl excep-. \ tJO!lS; . 
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ruies, in order to exploit the full  comparative advantage of labor 4 1  costs . Nevertheless, most government actions regarding labor 
rights reflect , to some degree, the basic requirer:nents and prefer­
ences of the work force since that work force is the body politic.42 
The social values of work are so fundamental that all governments 
' 1 b ] J • I d 1 .  j · . ' n2.ve some ru1es a out _aoor ng,lts an worKmg o�nartwns that are 
r 1 ' • 1 f' c 1 1 4J not rocused on the econom1c D e n e 1ts or tne rUAes. 
7 T  T l T  ' R l j ·  l .ii ow I nvestmen t ana Labor ' e ate to i?rza lnterre t:tte 
. h T I wlt J _ raae 
.! . .1 . 2. 1. ��'h E . r y  ' - . k> J e conormcs OJ , raae Ltn .age 
i he frequent international debates over linkage in Ihe last few 
years inevitably have begun with some type of economic justifica-. f ] '  l . . l 44 ...,�h .[ t . r . Gon .·or .ln,ong an 1ssue to traae. 1 e reason 1 0 r  t .�.11s rocus 1s 
41 See DAVID RICARDO, PRlNCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
TAXATION 7 4-7 6 (1969) (pointing out the comparative advantages of labor) .  Of 
course, those advocating protection of core labor rights argue that some coun­
tries resist such standards to gain an unfair competitive advantage . 
\'f/ e're not trying to impose our standards or values on other countries. 
We're not trying to deprive low-wage developing countries of their le­
gitimate comparative advantage. That concept is a foundation for free 
trade in the global trading system. However, we are opposed to a 
comparative advantage built on the unfair abuse of people. 
Mickey Kantor, The Perspective of the U.S. Trade Representative, in INTER· 
NATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 23, at 1 5- 1 6 .  
I t  is interesting to  note that in  public statements of  this type i t  is not un­
common to see the United States try to distance itself from a perception of pro­
tectionism rather than concern about proper comparative advantage. 
4 2  "Societies intervene when unfettered labor markets fail to deliver the 
most efficient outcomes, or when they want to move market outcomes into 
line with their preferences and values. Four reasons are often given for inter­
vention: uneven market power, discrimination, insufficient information, and 
inadequate insurance against risk." 1995 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, su­
pra note 3 1 ,  at 70. 
43 "Governments also intervene directly in the labor market to achieve par­
ticular social goals .  Some of the more common interventions include bans on 
child labor, protection for women and minority workers, setting of minimum 
wages, and legislation on workplace safety and health standards ."  !d. at 7 1 .  
44 See OECD, TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A 
STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1996) 
[hereinafter OECD STUDY] (discussing labor standards) ; Richard B. Freemen, 
International Labor Standards and World Trade: Friends or Foes, in THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM:  CHALLENGES AHEAD 87 (1996) ; T.N. Srinivasan, Interna­
tional Labor StandArds Once Again!, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS, 
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fairly obvious : why should the international trade community add. 
to or transform existing multilateral ru)es unless doing so ·would 
L h 1 d . ff' . )4' . d' 
• h 1 ·  ., mn er traae an economiC e . 1c1ency ; Accor, mgly, t e mKage 
debate has spurred attempts to analyze the economics of trade and 
investment,40 and trade and labor.47 An examination of these 
1 d 1 . . . l h  h . I ! . ana_ yses, an tne1r cntlques, revea s t . at t e econom1cs or tne cwo 
• •  • 1 llnkages are not tne sa..rne. 
L 1 . 2. 1 . 1. Investment 
·-r\_, a r•·::J · ,... � ... b -l,r t- , dp . l "  . '1t 1 I t"i �h ,--, -· i'l a. ·/' 1 o ro .. , .. • � r  ... .:· __ uc.  _ _  , _  b c1 ou; o aca ,.__m1c lter""_u. e o .. c e ;:,e .. ,__ l ar '--'-onorE __ ,b, 
f r • -l .  . ("FDI". 48 �� · 
� 1 o o re1gn c.drecr mvestment � ) . l lle most recem: a nc com-
. . r h f , . 1 1 . 1 prehens1ve report or t. e purposes 0 1  H nKage a n a .ysts , .1 owevet, 
1 ' • \VTTQ S · ' · · 1 1 , -r ' d � ·was oone by tne w . ecretanat ana 1s entlt ea · t rade a n _  !-' o r-
. ·- . I 49 Th . 09 S . " f d e1gn .U1rect nvestment. 1s 1 / 6 ecretanat 1\.eport · ocuse · or::. 
rhe " i_nterlinkages-economic, institutional , legal�with world 
rl "'0 d. h S 
. R f ' . . . t rade. Accor mg to t e ecretanat . .  epon most o the empmcal 
work on the economic linkage between trade and FDI has not fo­
cused on causation,5 1 but rather on whether trade and FDI are sub­
stitutes (negatively correlated) or complements (posit ively corre-
supra note 23, at 73; see also 1996 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 25 ,  
at  95- 1 28 .  
4 5  "[T)he trade rules are for economic efficiency, which generaily helps 
everyone (with internal distribution problems beino- tackled by other pol icies) ; 
they are not there simply to assist specific factors of production (i . e . ,  capital) o r  
economic agents (i .e . ,  multinationals) . "  Bhagwati, supra note 23, at 57 . 
46 The literature on the economics of the linkage between trade and in­
vestment is fairly large. For the best compilat ion of sources see\'VORLD TR.ADE 
ORGANIZATION, TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (Oct. 9,  1996) ,  
available at Annual Report-Investment (visited May 8 ,  1998) < http:!hvww. 
wto.org/wto/archives/chpiv.htm > [hereinafter TRADE AND FDI]. 
47 The most recent study of the economics of the l inkage between trade 
and labor ri�hts is the OECD Study. See supra note 44. The OECD Study it­
self is not wnhout problems. For a thorough critique and analysis, see Charno­
vitz, supra note 26. Another study on the Issue is supposed to be forthcoming 
from Rodrik. See RODRIK, supra note 32 (summarizmg the author's conclu­
sions; . 
4 See generally KAR-YIU WONG, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND 
FACTOR MOBILITY (1995) ;  J.R. Markusen, The Boundaries of Multinational En­
terprises and the Theory oflnternatiorza! Trade, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 1 69 (1995) . 
49 T See RADE AND FDI, supra note 46. 
50 !d. at 2. 
51 "[T]he empirical work . . .  has not tried to establish causation-that is, 
to determine, for example, whether inflows of FDI cause exports to be greater 
than they would otherwise be or if, instead, expanding exports attract increased 
FDI." !d. at 7. 
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lated) .52 The Secretariat Report reviews and analyzes this work 
from two perspectives: (1) what the driving force (motivation) is 
behind FDJ at the level of the firm; and, (2) the empirical evidence 
of l inkage.:,3 Since the motivations for why a firm invests rather 
than expo rts or l icenses its technology help to explai n the phe­
n o me n o n  of FDI, they are examined first . Iviultinational corpora-. L 1 ' r h · r· · r twns co.m.e auou-t as r:n.e resu.lt ot L ree Clrcumstances. r< 1 rst.  a 1 1 rrn  
,.._., ..,. .,.  � r '  ...., t=:>"'r .� r '!- .,.. _....,. ..-") :-• 1 0 . 0t,..; ·"\bl 1 ; d ,.. 1 ,- ·r·cro ' ,.. / ... 1 :;::. 54 u .ay o d ,.  ""'"ss..__ u ,_ ,.t a L c �.d D·- p rv . •  ta. 1y exp o,te on a la" 6._ .) ,_;:l.i,, . 
-1 r· ' " 1 "  ' I  r · · · ' " f "  ,..l • 1 · - · Seconc,, pron•:<�blllty or r. n e  n rm ;s mcreased 1 1t prouuces m m:Her-. ) )  , ..,. ,  • . • 1 ,.. 
b 
. � 1 . 
ent cou ntnes. .i. !n rd , tEe':: o ronts to e macle trom such 1 n vest>· 
· · .- · o f� ..::.1 .--. :::l. - r-' . ...- f �·· · . - --r , � �-.roc. ; n  h 56 r.nenc:, al ,_ f!/ -.... "'tL chdll "' (J 1 1 .  u . •�·� nsu1g t e assets. 
T' !-, n  P ' ' •  : �: � .. , 1  P' , � >'' 1""\ ("F 0 ,.., th.o  1 " 'Kj t r'� r ,.,., -, J .o-rp• .l. L-'� -.n lp, , !l,o. � lh.l-- .1  - - " ' r . .... ln age lS .ar . 1 o m  ,,.O.:. d i:h ·� o �  . 
.C 1 r 1 1 ' ' d 1 . . 1 • 1 most Ot t .. 1e useru1 w o r  ;:, has been one on y on relatwnshw oe-
� -- - d 1 • 1 S7 d , · · .  . . � , . .. . J.. , tween J:-< .U .l �Hl · ,uaae m gooc.1S an there 1s h mtted avallab1l1ty and 
• • I "  .1 )s n · L 1 - · · t ,... · qualny or uata. .L... esp1te t nese nn1tat10ns, t11e .)ecretanat Report 
52 The WTO Secretariat does not believe that it is important for l inkage 
purpo��s to ,esr.ablish wh�ther . FDI and tra�e are substitutes _or co.mplements smce · La] suostltute relat1onsh1p can create JUSt as strong an mterlmka,.e as a 
complcmcmaq one. And if they are interlinked, it means that trade poYicy af­
fects FDI flows, . . .  and therefore that both sets of policies would benefit !rom 
beir�S treated in an integrated manner. " !d. 
' See id. 
54 See id. at 8 .  The Secretariat points out that research conducted on whv 
firms invest rather than export or license has been studied for forty years and 
there is a general consensus on this and the other points. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. at 1 2- 1 3  
58 !d. at 13 .  According t o  the report: 
The available statistics on FDI, which are far from ideal, come mainly 
from three sources. First, there are statistics from the records of minis­
tries and a�encies which administer the country's laws and regulations 
on FDI. �l he request for a license or the fulfillment of notification re­
quirernents allows these agencies to record data on FDI flows. Typi­
cally, re-invested earnings, intra-company loans, and liquidation's of 
investment are not recorded, and not all notified investments are fully 
realized in the period covered by notification. 
Second, there are the FDI data taken from government and other 
surveys which evaluate financial and operating data of companies . 
While these data provide information on sales (domestic and foreign) , 
earnings, employment and the share of value added of foreign affiliates 
in domestic output, they often are not comparable across countries be­
cause of differences in definitions and coverage. Third, there are the 
data taken from national balance-of-payments statistics, for which in­
ternationaliy agreed guidelines exist in the fifth edition of the llv'.tF Baf-
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assesses the information available on FDI and its effects on the 
h?me and the host. coumries.59 FDI a�d trade a.re not s im�hr �:;b­
stltutes or alternative means for reachmg a fore1gn market. 1 he 
relationship between trade and the dynamic effects of FDI are more 
generally complementary.61 However,  the trade policies of coun­
tries can affect whether FDI is a complement or substitute. Low 
and bound tariffs (the WTO goal) attract export-oriented FDI, 
while high tariffs serve to induce tariff jumping FDI to serve the lo­
cal market.62 FDI can also be undertaken �s a quid pro quo, which 
would be a way of lessening the i .mpact of protectionist trade po1i-­
cies.63 The FDI which responds to low costs of p roduction and ,;_ 
liberal . trading regime is l ikely to be complementary with irn-· 
ports.6·1 By contrast , the tariff-jumping FDI acts as a substitute for 
trade. 65 Overal l ,  a combination of l iberal t rade and investment 
oolicies increases FDI.66 The Secretariat Reoort also concludes that ' ' 
FDI adds to overall economic development of states by producing 
ance of Payments ivfanual. The three main categories of FDI described 
above are those used in balance-of-payments statistics. 
!d. at 3 .  
59 See id. at 13-14 .  
60 See id. at 14- 1 8 .  
6 1  "[T]here is no serious empirical support for the view that FDI has an 
important negative effect on the overall level of exports from the home coun­
try." Jd: at 12 .  Rather, the empirical evidence points to � modestly positive re­
lattonsh!p between FDI and home count1y exports and 1mports. !d. at 13-1 5  
(which contains a review o f  the empirical evidence) . 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. at 1 3 .  
65 See id. a t  10 ,  39 .  
66 See id. at 37. Trade policy is only one asl?ect of which determines 
whether FDI will enter a country but it plays a speC!al role  in assisting with the 
larges� FDI problem at the level of the firm-the degree of risk and uncertainty 
over ume. 
!d. 
It follows that the structure and stability o f  current and possible future 
trade polices , both of potential host countries and of potential foreign 
markets, will be important influence on the willingness of firms to 
seek customers in foreign markets, locate production processes in host 
countries, or separate the oroduction processes into stages located in 
different countries. 
• 
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intangibles, particularly the transfer of technology,67 and by stimu­
lating growth and competit iveness . 
The economic evidence illustrates that FDI is l inked with trade. 
While FDI is much more than simply another way of trading it 
clearly facilitates trade with benefits running to  countries at all lev­
els of development. The WTO Secretariat believes that taking 
some measures, such as achieving some form of pol icy coherence 
regarding investment , m ight also assist in boosting the least devei-
' . 68 oped countnes. 
1 . 1 . 2. 1 . 2 .  T 1 Labor 
A review of the existing l iterature on the economics of linking 
labor rights and trade leads to several conclusions. First, there is an 
extraordinarily l imited base of empirical evidence.69 Second, there 
are disagreements between those who have studied the lim tted em­
pirical data.70 Third, because of the limited data and disagreements 
only a few observations can be made. 
The first issue-a lack of a thorough empirical study of the l inks 
between core labor rights and trade flows-poses a serious p roblem. 
The 1996 OECD Study bases its conclusions about the trade link­
age solely on statistical evidence about freedom of association and 
collective bargaining? 1 As a result, it is impossible to cal ibrate how 
and to what extent governments discriminate, use forced or ex­
ploited child labor, and, consequently, how much these practices 
67 See id. at 7-8 . The transfer of technology that occurs through FDI, 
which is the _primary channel for developing countries, leads to greater produc­
tivity. See id. at 7. The characteristics of the countries does matter. The more 
competitive the conditions, the higher the levels of local investment in fixed 
capital accompanied by the fewest restrictions on affiliates increases in the 
amount of technology transfer. See id. 
68 See id. at 40. 
69 See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 1 1 ,  48, 86; see also Charnovitz, supra 
note 26, at 138 .  Charnovitz criticizes the OECD for failing to make estimates 
of the value of annual trade in products made by violating core labor rights es­
pecially given some of its own findings. For example, the Secretariat provides 
evidence of child labor exploitation in a few export-oriented industries in some 
countries. See id. at 138 ,  n. 64. 
7 0  OECD STUDY, supra note 44, with the conclusion reached by Charno­
vitz, supra note 26, at 143 & n. l l l-12. Rodrik also suggests a different result 
from the one reported in the OECD STUDY conclusion. See RODRIK, supra 
note 32, at 45-46. 
7 1  See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 86. 
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affect t rade performance .72 Prescribing new international ndes to 
1 f + . . 1 • 'J . , 1 encourage tne en orcement o" mmunum stanaards seem.s unuKe y 
in the face of limited informat ion about th·� scope and dimension 
the "problem."
73 
Without a clear picture of the extent to which 
low standards exist and what their effects are, it is unclear whether 
h ' 1 '  b h 
J d 1 1 • • t ere W ! t l ever e an agreement on t e neea t o  - evewp tr;:we-re.lated 
ruies regarding labor, much less what the p roper set of multilateral 
1 I _. t ' 1 1 • •o 1 i . �  -... • ' ,-1 ru les and any en torcement mechamsm should looK 11ke.  · .t h1s data ' I h dd' . . d' l ' ' ' . ]: 1' -gap o e m a.nc.s t .at  a 1 t1 0nal stu 1es oe conducted \Vhlc 1 rnay 01.ter 
1 • d h . 1 1 ' • ' i  74· a m o r e  compiete p1cture an elp reso lve tr:.e second pro btern.  
:� �- .�. - -. r  rl 1 1 ; � +h d "  r: - y--r c -· -. � l ., , .,_ � 1-� .-, �� - � .a.  ·:":!�V · C' .  � ll c �;:�.-On� proo em 1S u e 1sa61 e e , ll,; L L  d L) O c.- L  ,'/11.:>� :..;�� c.'-L>C-
ing dJ.ta reveals. The OECD Study) which ex;1mines the linking of 
' ' 1  I I ' b 'd · · · , · · 1 • 1 trade and 1aoor, oegms y 1 enniymg \v_hat 1t cons1aers to !x; tne , . . . 1 . - " 1 b . h ,7'j (' 1 1 1 m rcec unrverse ot core a or  ng ts. _:,orne atternpt must oe 
made to identify core labor rights in orde r to compile and ma..ke 
sense of the limited econom ic data on E:overnment practices. The 0 � 
l ist arrived at by the OECD is identical to that adopted by the 
World Social Summit in 1 99576 and by the ILO itself when it has 
d . 1 " " l b . 1 77 Th ' J f 1 1 • 1 . . .11scussea core . a or ngnts. e Douy o · core aoor ng 1ts iden-
tified by the OECD for its economic analysis includes the freedoms 
of association and collective bargaining, and the prohibitions of 
+ d 1 b , . . h ' ld I b d , . . . L . 78 ,orce .a or, exploitative c 1 a or, an C11scnmmauon. 
72 See id. at 1 1 . ("The lack of reliable indicators of enforcement of  stan­
darcis on child labour, forced labour and non-discrimination is especially acute. 
Available evidence in this area is mostly anecdotal , making any attempt to :ma­
lyse the economic implications of these standards problematic.") .  
7 3  The col lection of data on labor standards would b e  a logical job for the 
ILO.  If that organization could set core labor rights identified and out a super­
viso;:r mechanism in place there would ultimately be a reliable data base. 
7 This same obserntion was made following a symposium on interna­
tional labor standards in 1994. See Kenneth A. Swinnerton & Gregory K. 
S.:hoepfle, Emerging Themes, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS, supra 
n01:e 23 , at 63. 
75  See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 25-73.  
76  See id. at 25. 
77 The ILO Office produced a report in 1994 which pointed to the same 
core labor standards as those the ILO Governing Body has suggested by consid­
ered at the 1998 International Labor Conference. See infra note 7.  
73 All of the core rights, with the exception of exoloitative child labor, are 
embodied in existing ILO Conventions: . 
• 
Freedom of Association: is the right of workers and employers; to estab­
lish and join organizations of th.eir choosing without previous authori­
zation; to draw up their own constitutions and n.lles, elect their repre­
sentatives, and formulate their programs; to joint in confederatwns 
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The study then proceeds to examine whether protection of 
· • · · · · · rr· · 79 I these co re nghts enhances or 1mpa1rs economic emCiency. t con-
' · 1 ' • r h • 1 'f' I l b • ' ll cluaes t hat the protection ot L e 10ent1 1ea core a or nghts actua y 
1 • rr· . 80 Th £ t . ff ri "f' ennances econormc ettlClency. . e reasons or tn1s e ect ul rers 
md affil iate with int-':mat ional organizations; and to be protected 
against dissolution or suspens ion by administrative authority . 
Faye Lyle, V/orkers R ight in U.S. Policy, FOREIGN LABOR TR ENDS, at 20 
(Bureau of Int ' l  Labor Affairs, U.S .  Dept. o f  Labor ed. , 199 l) ;c/ Convention 
C:oncernti�i; Forced or �Comp:_tlsor;; / L�bour, as Modifie
_
d by th_e Fi nal -� rt icles i.\.ev!SlOfl Lomrentwn, :-,ept. b ,  19-to, 39 U.N.T.S.  55,  ) 6  [heremc1fte:r C/onven­
t io!!  Concerning Forced Con:pulsory Labour]. 
Co!iecti ue BMgain ing (the right to organize and bargain collectively) is 
the right of workers to be represented in negotiatmg the p revent ion and settlement of disputes with employers; to protect!On against inter­
ference c.vith union act ivit ies; to protection against acts of anti -union 
discrimination; and to p rotection against refusal of  employment, dis­
m issal, or prejudice due to uaion membership or participation. 
Lyle, supra at 22; cf Convention (No .  98) Concerning the Application o f  the 
Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collect ively, July 1 ,  1949, 96 
U.N.T.S.  257, 258 .  . 
Forced Labor: "[W]ork or service exacted from any person under the men­
ace of penalty and for which the l?.erson has not volunteered. 'Menace of pen­
alty' includes loss of rights or privtleges as well as penal sanctions ."  Lyle,supra 
at 24; cf Convention Concernmg Forced or  Compulsory Labour, supra at  58 . 
. Di�crimine1:tio;z in Employment: "[D]i�crimination if!lplies th�� if discrimi­
nat;on 1s practiCed, employment and earnmgs opportumttes are al located based 
on cons idera t ions not related to how well someone does a job,  intuition sug­
gests that some individuals may end up not employed in jobs to which they are 
Sest suited. � Kenneth Swinnerton, A n  Essay on Economic Efficiency and Core 
Labour Sr.andards, in THE WORLD ECONOMY 73, 78 (1997); cf Conventio n  
(No .  1 1 1) Concerning Discrimination i n  Respect of Employment and Occupa­
tion, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S.  3 1 ,  32-33 .  
T h e  issue o f  exoloitative child labor i s  more difficult to define. Obvio usly, 
the issue of  how old a child worker should be is an issue. The ILO does have a 
Convention on the Minimum Age of Employment . See Convention (No . 138) 
Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, June 6, 1973 , 1 0 1 5  
U.N.T.S. 297, 298. 
According to United Nations Children's Fund ("UNICEF") , child exploi­
tation is "characterized by children who work too young, too long hours, for 
too little pay, in hazardous conditions or under slave-like arrangements ."  
OECD STUDY, sttpra note 44, at 37. See also Janelle M. D iller & David Levy, 
Child Ltbor, Trade and Investment: Toward the Harmonization of International 
Law, 91 AM. J.  INT'L L. 663, 666, n. 24 (Oct . 1997) (noting that while a defini­
tion of exploitative child labor has yet to  be adopted, the ILO is in the process 
of working on a new convention, based upon the existing ILO conventions 
such as forced labor, for a convention that will be considered by the Interna­
tional Labor Conference in 1999) .  
79 See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 77-82 . 
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according to the type of rights. The core labor rights that are be1sed 
on prohibitions-of forced labor, exploitative child labor8 1 and dis­
crimination-enhance economic efficiency by being the appropriate 
response to distortions in the allocation of labor resources created 
by the p rohibited practices. 82 For example, in the case of forced la­
bor, such laborers by definition are not allowed to maximize their 
uti l ity or move to other activities that match their abilities and d[:·· 
. SJ � ·  " 1 d "  . . b h f h r J . . s1res. Sm11 ar 1stort 10ns anse ot · rom t1  e use ot exp,.orc;:;.t � ve 
child labor and discrimination i n  hbor laws and regulation
�
s .  34 
The other core labor rights, specifically the freedoms, arc l lY >  
portant because they can produce positive efficiency ef ects. S:> The 
f d . rl I • 1 1 . ' d . . i reel om to associate an._. to oargam co  ectlvely o th1s oy COl.:.n ttr-
balance the market power of employers, providing organizc::rt i.o nal. 
and legal support for i ndividual workers and providing the c:hann�l 
through which workers share their knowledge of the business with 
employers .  86 Since the protection of core labor rights enh<li1ces 
economic efficiency,  the crucial issue becomes why all countries do 
-
80 See id. at 2 1 5-30; Analytical Appendix entitled Core Labour Standards, 
Economic Efficiency and Trade, 21 5-230; see also Swinnerton, supra note 78 .  
8 1 [E]mployment discrimination unambiguously reduces economic ef­
ficiency. The reason is that such a practice causes a misallocation of re­
sources while also reducing the availability of production factors .  
Forced labour and child labour exploitation also cause a misallocation 
of resources, thus reducing economic efficiency, but they might also 
raise the quantity of labour available for production. 
OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 230. 
82 See id. at 80. 
8 3  See id. at 79. 
84 See id. The OECD concludes that as a result, prohibition is the aooro­
priate policy response for forced labor and exploitative child labor and · dis­
crimination. See id. at 80, 82. 
85 See id. at 80-8 1 .  
86 See id. at 8 1 .  The OECD Study, however, points out that there are other 
issues that arise concerning the freedoms of association and to collectively bar­
gain. It is not clear, for example, what level of bargaining is iikely to produce 
the best results. See id. Unions also produce costs. See id. at 82 .  As a result the 
OECD concludes that: 
[t]he form of union and employer organization that is conducive to the 
highest level of efficiency is l ikely to differ from country to country, as 
it depends on specific historical and cultural factors .  Although free­
dom of AssociatiOn is a basic human right and may help reduce certain 
distortions in the economy, it is no less true that particular forms of 
union organization an collective bargaining may introduce new ones. 
!d. at 82. 
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not act accordingly. 87 The existing commentary disagrees on the 
number88 of reasons and why.89 Among the various reasons for 
non-compliance, however, it IS clear that some are trade-based. 90 
Some countries remain persuaded that protecting core l abor rights 
l imits their ability to enhance trade performance. 
There is disagreement among those reporting and reviewing the 
existing data on the correlation between the protection of core la­
bor rights and trade. 9 1  According to the OECD, the empirical re·· 
sults of its study fai l  to support the view that countries with low la­
bor standards have gains in export market share as compared !0 
high standa.rds countries.92 The OECD conclusion may have lim­
ited value in persuading errant countries, however, because as Steve 
Charnovitz has pointed out, the conclusion in the study does not 
appear to fully �arch the OECD data. 93 Some of the OECD sta­
tistics do, in fact , indicate that countries with low standards have 
benefited in the shape of increased trade gains. 94 This OECD data 
87 The OECD offers five reasons why states may fail to adopt core labor 
standards : (1) Public Good Argument: public goods cannot be accomplished 
by market forces _alone because of the free rider problem; (2) Blocking Minor­
ity Argument: it a country lacks standards and then takes them on, a si�nifi­
cant minority (perhaps powerful) would be worse off and try to block; (3; En­
dogeneity Argument: that core labor standards are not shaped by rolicies but 
by market outcomes that are influenced by economic growth; (4 Economic 
Development : non-observance of standards is used as a strategy for promoting 
export trade and attract foreign direct investment. Id. at 83-85 .  
88  Charnovitz argues that the OECD does not consider, at this point, one 
other argument it does raise later for countries that fail to adopt core standards. 
It may be argued that they lack the financial and legal resources to enforce such 
standards. See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 14 1 ,  n. 10 1 .  Charnovitz also offers 
yet another reason for failure to adopt standards. Countries may want to raise 
standards but feel constrained because of fears about competing with other 
countries that will not. See id. at 142. 
89 Charnovitz points out that the public goods argument makes no sense 
and that the blockmg minority and endogeneity arguments are not proven by 
the OECD analysis. See id. at 140-4 1 .  
90 The economic development argument proffered by  the OECD and 
Charnovitz's suggestion about the perception/ reality of fear of competition are 
trade based. Under both theories, governments are failing to adapt core labor 
rights protections because they believe that acting otherwise will increase trade 
and economic growth. 
9 1  Compare OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 80- 101 ,  with Charnovitz,supra 
note 26, at 143, n . 1 12-1 3 . 
92 See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 92. 
93 See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 143 & n. 1 12. 
94 See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 92-93,  1 32-33 .  
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thus may be more in line with another study which has indicated 
that "comparative advantage in l abor-intensive goods . . . was asso-
• ' . 1 • ' .  f 1 ' I l • ' ' oated wnn ma1 cawrs o abor stanaaras m t.t1e expected m<Jnner: 
the more relaxed the standard, the larger the revealed comparative 
1 • 1 L. . . .L ,9)  T' d '  . 1 L aavantage m auour-mtens1ve goous. .... he 1spanty oetween tne 
OECD conclusio n and its own evidence could explain -�vhy the de-l . . ' . f' 1 l l 1 '  r ' h . ' ve opmg count nes cllng so terce.y to tne oe 1er t hat t•�e mtroduc-. f . • • • I 1 ' ' ., b • r .j 1 • 1 n o n  o mternatwnal laoor stanaards would e h ;;� rrntLL to tt11.::1 r  u .--
t imate economic development. If this is t ru e  it is not cle<1.r that 
1 . ' 1' 1 ' . • . l l • tHese same cou m n e s  w1 1 alter the1r v1ews stm.p1y oecause they en· 
· · rb , .  · w·  · 1  1 ' • • gage m trace d •  c rctt 1 zat 1 0 n .  h! e tnere appears to oe a posmve re-
lat ionship bet·ween r: he liberal ization of trade and the actual prot-ec­
tion of labor righcs , the OECD Study failed to fi nd ?.ny causality . 
h % between t. em. 
Th b 
. 1 1 h d d . ' i . 
. 
J d e o servauons t nat can oe reac e esp1tc the nmrtea � ata 
and disagreements are that: (1) the protection of core labor rights 
can promote economic efficiency; (2) there may or may not be sorne 
link between a low level of labor rights protection and increased 
trade performance; and, (3) there is a generally positive relationship 
between the pro tection of labor rights and trade liberalization. For 
the purpose of the debate about l inking t rade and labor rights the 
second observation could pose the most serious barrier to obtaining 
trade-based rules on core labor rights. If low standards countries de 
obtain a trade advantage then those advocating that countri-::s 
should adopt such rules are robbed of the argument that protecting 
core labor rights will not impair trade gains or growth. 
1. 1 . 2. 2. 177e Interests and A bilities of Governments and the 
International Community 
For both investment and labor, a government has a sovereign 
interest in  regulation .  Labor and capital are core components of a 
country's wealth,  productivity and competitiveness . Whether a 
government should regulate ali aspects of labor and investment, 
however, is not clear. In some areas to achieve both the most eco-
As Charnovitz ooints out, the OECD's statistics reveal that the countries with 
low and l ittle to no standards had significant increases in exports (44 . 1% :and 
45.3%) compared to the groups with high standards and some limitations (2 . 6% 
and 5 . 1% respectively) .  Charnovitz also points to other evidence. See id. at 143 
& n. 1 13 .  
95 RODRlK, supra note 32, at 46. But see Freeman supra note 44 at 101-04. 
96 See OECD ST!..JDY, supra note 44, at 1 12 .  
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. • h 1 
• 
nom1C<11ly sound and . umane resu lt s a governrnent must see a mlx-
ture of rest rictions and comprehensive intervention and near or to­
tal withdrawal from regulation. 97 \'vhatever a countrt does regard­
mg mvestmem or  labor, however,  it cannoc insulate its decisions 
from outside influences. 
The i nterests of the international commuruty m both area.'> 
r 1 b 1 "  • 98 'Vf l ; · d• ' ' • comes rro m g o a 1zat1on. Vv o r  a w1 e t raGe ana mvestment ' . . " }- 1 f . 1 b ! . l make 1t 1rnpossw e o r  most count nes a o r  ann I nvestment ru ,es to ' . 1 b l f I . ' .- • be wn 1out some consequences otn . or oc ner  countnes and tor ul-. 1 ·· · 1 "d  · · ·r · · · 1 t 1 rr1ate CYt-l e .ra l \-rvo rlc 1:.r1  e econ.om.1c g.r,J ·�;l tf: . · �t h.e lnt errtatiOi1a_ 
...., . • - � , .... . - \ ..,. ..., ......,.. r: ,..., J YO ; . � <c- (""' - , 1 � -:-• - ··y : ,_ ' ·  ,- 1_� O co r ntnu rL :. y 1.1;,:, \v.ty;:, 01 p, ,_ss!ng, o" en ..... c- ;,.i , CJ;_;, • ug -._ua.nge .Ll gov-
...... __ , . 1- 1 . . . . . .... ..-.. a' 1 +- .  r �r "" . ...  ��,r ,..., ..... .... ·· r· a - · .... ·�-- . ., �  yo- - c r. � ,, -·- � - ... e, fl u 1 e fl c  u1 VI:·, v. fl  regu aLlOIL-.  . u t ct1  suVt; , L cc! '-.i .< l. o..l 01 ):;ail < r�aL.t0D.S,  
l ike the \VTO, the ILO, the OECD, and non-governmental o r -
. . . . . l . ! t g-amzatwns can momtor ex1stmg governmental pract1ces ana ruJ es 
• " l . 1 · •  • I (L "  " wtn e governments can negotlate new- rm.ntllateral rUles \ u md1ng or 
nonbinding) on the p rotection of investment and labor rights.  Any 
such rule-making process may or  may not be accompanied by a 
mechanism for enforcing the multilateral rules, such as binding dis­
pute settlement and sanctions .  
With regard to current international efforts regarding labor 
rights, there are numerous multilat-eral conventions that identify 
rights and standards. The ILO con:;�ntions, however, only bind a 
country if ratified by that country . ' 1 Moreover, the conventions 
a!'e voluntary as to scope of convention adopt ions and enforce.rnent 
comes from persuasion exercised by ILO 1v1ember states . Regional 
integration arrangements have identified labor rights as a concern 
to monitor (National American Free Trade Agreemem) or a com­
ponent of the operation of a single market (European Community) 
and have acted accordingly. In the sense of investment rights and 
p rotections, bilateral, regional , and multilateral ef orts exist to lib-
l .  r1 . 1 00 A1 , • • d "++ . 1 .  era 1ze anu protect mvestment. 1though t1-1ey 1ber m app 1ca-
97 See generally 1995 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 3 1 ,  at 70-
79; see also Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 139-40. 
98 See generally Eddy Lee, Globalization and Labour Standards: A Review of 
Issues, 136 lNT'L LAB. REV. (1997) .  
99 The ILO has adopted over 170 different conventions dealing with labor 
rights and standards . 
100 See TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46, at 23-38 (analyzing the current 
status of national regulations, bilateral investment treaties, regional and pluri­
lateral agreements and multilateral agreements) ; see also, 1996 "WORLD IN­
VESTMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 1 3 1 -59 (surveying the same field) . Given 
the focus of the WTO and UNCT AD, it is not surprising chat the W1 0 report 
is concerned with policy coherence, while UNCI'AD is interested in the devel-
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bility, scope, and enforcement power, all attexnpt some general 
harrnonization of the basic rights and protections to give some cer­
tainty or stabil ity for an investor's decisions. 
1 he interplay between a government 's interest in regulating 
each area and its inability to control completely the consequences 
of its choices currently spurs arguments about the need for multi­
lateral trade-related rules. Multilateral argu.ments for trade-related 
1 • d l b h r ' . ,  • n l es on mvestrnent an a o r  ave otten begun ·�v1tt1 tb� statement 
rh:a.t the existence of lower standards acts as an unfair trade practice 
. ' h' ' ' I T  o r  as an unnecessary restramt on poss1u J.e t rade g::-f.)vittL '·J ongov-
t:"· r"�") -........ l .c. -� "1 - '1 1 , ; 7 .  . d - 1 'l ,. -C.. ·,c ;  ,_., . cr-t 1 ·::-, f(. ·r· ;;: ·t r · ) n o- � · -, __ , __ d . •- 1 1 [ ,_1 organ , �,1tlons an ,)cno ars 0 1 L-- n  ... r ..; - -·- , .J � · ' " · · c .,,.., an  en L.l '- -
r 1 1 • • , 1 1 b 1 ' 1 ·  , 1 '  , • rorceao1e mult1latera ru es ecause t.oey be 1 eve o n!y a. wor c1w1de 
. c. � � �- · .. ; � d "l a h j ·� \... � ,, : ., . , -, r o  U ; l l  " ' •  P r ..._ �_, u ;.:,l l l c l Oll , <til agre._rpent On OW .0 C O !.. l ! U c L ;1_ (., ._ , ) .._ 5 , 'N1 ... Ol •f,, 
• . - , ' r •  ' bl 10 1 the 1c1ent1hed pro .em. 
2. LINKAGE AND THE PROCESS OF TRADE-RELATED 
RULE-MAKING 
2. 1 .  Possible Rule-Making Preconditions for Trade-Related Rule­
Jvfaking 
Another perspective from which to examine the linkage be­
tween trade and investment and trade and labor focuses not on the 
- 1 d f ' d 1 d 102 . l 1 '  k . nature ot eac 1 ,  an o 1ts tra e-re ate ness, but on now m age 1s 
made concrete. \X'hen and why should the international commu-. 
d 1 h 'vrTO 103 h ' 1 . . mty, as represente oy t e w , c oose rule-:ma ong m re-
oprnemal aspects of FDI rules. Compare TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46, at 42, 
with 1996 WORlD INVESTiv1ENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 1 58-59 . 
10 1 Even then, the advocates do not always ;lgree on the method to be used. 
For example , those arguing for labor rights differ on whether it is a trade or la­
bor issue for rule-making and institutronal oversight. See generally Erika de 
Wet , Labor Standards in the Globalized Economy: The Inclusion of a Social Clause 
in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade/World Tnuie Organization, 17 
HUM. RTS. Q. 443 (1995) ;  Ray Marshall ,  Trade-Linked Labor Standards, 37 
PROC. OF ACAD. OF POL. Sci. 67 (1990) ; Gijsbert Van Liemt,Minimum Labour 
Standards and International Trade: Would a Social Clause Wm-k?, 128 lNT'L LAB. 
REV. 433 (1989) ; Brian A .  Lan_gille, General Reflections on the Relationship of 
Trade and Labor (Or: Fair Traae is Free Trade's Destiny), in FAIR TRADE AND 
HARMONIZATION, supra note 7, at 23 1 .  
102 See supra Sections 1 . 1 .  and 1 . 1 .2 .  (discussing of the nature of labor and 
investment and the economic linkages each has with trade) . 
103 The WTO is chosen as the focus for this part of the article because its 
focus has been on the linkage to trade. As the o·rganization with jurisdiction 
over trade, and some trade-related rules, the WTO is the logical choice. 
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sponse to a suggested linkage? Different approaches exist for find-­
ing an answer to that question. One approach would be to exam­
ine whether a suggested linkage consti tutes a proper subject for 
. " . b h "\Vr�o 104 Th" f . . r constderatwn y t e w 1 . · ts type o exammatwn tocuses on 
1 cv·Te . . . 1 05 d " J l  h d . 1 " l "  f tne \'v . ·J as an mstrtutwn an can L ustrate t. e · es.traol rty o -
1 ' . • 106 • l 1 . d 1 "  1 j • sucH a im.kage. Anotner approacn 1s to stu y m".;:age oy examm-
• ' 1 • 1 ' .[ d 1 1 l ·; . mg nc)t the O DJ ect out the process 01 tra e-re1atea ru .e-ma Kmg. 
�"'' . • r 1 • 'i £ 11 h d h 1 h.! :> seen on or. cne arnc1e o .ows L e secon . approac." . 
.,. 1 ' h' 1 . . ' 1 n  uro.er to conduct sue an ana ys1s  some retracmg rnust !.te 
dent ot the recent past and of how trade-related rules were negoti -
, • ; .,. T 
- 'C) .l 107 A J- ' • • f '/ " • � �,-,'t.c.r-1 ! ii � ;� -,(· i J 1llY-p a·v �-, ouna r'.L lLer ihl' re'JleY.f r) : 'L'· n e� h 'l �.-L*0 n. ; _ 1o- o.- '-'· .• • . .  ... _ .  '"' _. ... b ·- .1 .... - • - ..... ... " - .... ... -� - -....... ......, "" I  "J 
v::. Phil ip J\Tichols has chosen this approach in recent articles. Drawing 
upon cbe theoreiicai -.;'tork by Paul Taylor on the typology of international or­
ganiz;;t [ons, Nichols points out that the WTO can be best explained as engaging 
ln cooidination st>':le of inter�overnmental cooperation.  See Philip 1v1. Nichols, 
Comtptwn zn the Wodd Traae Organzzatzon: Dzscernzng the Lzmzts of the World 
Trade-Organization 's A uthority, 28 N.Y.U. J .  INT'L  L. & POL. 71 1 ,  72 1 (1996) . 1 85 Applying Taylor's coordination model to the WTO leads Nichols to 
charactenze 1t "as an organization [that] is l egally mandated to create a frame­
work for the regulation of international trade,  and will supervise the compli­
ance of members' national policies with this framework." !d. It is against this 
characterization that Nichols poses his question of what issues should be pur­
sued by the WTO. He arrives at four criteria drawn from Taylor's characteri­
zat ion . The criteria are as fol lows: (1) whether an issue is within the legal ju­
risdiction of the WTO; (2) whether the issue i s  substantial; (3) whether the 
\(�TO w�ll  be, ab!e to enfo�ce c?mpliance with any_ require,ments it, imposes; and (4) whether the tssue regtllres mternatwnal coordmatw n  oy the WTO . See id. 
at 722-40. 
106 \'1/h i.le rhis article does not follow the Nichols' approach his explication 
of the theory of institutionalism and its relevance to WTO rule-making is quite 
enlightening and useful .  Aoplied to the issue of whether the WTO should in­
volve itself with labor stanaards Nichols points out that it should not because 
the issue of labor standards fails to meet the second and third criteria. If the 
WTO had supervision of labor rights such a resolution would not s ignificantly 
increase trade (thus, it is not a substantial issue) and the WTO wouid have great 
difficulty enforcing labor rules. See Philip M. Nichols, Forgotten Link..ages­
Historic,1l Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism and A nalysis of the 
World Trade Organ ization, in Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon: A n  Interdis­
ciplinary Approach, 19  U. PA. J .  lNT'L ECON. L 201 (1998) . 
107 This article focuses on the recent past during the Uruguay Round be­
cause that set of negotiations marked the first time "new" subj ects were pro­
posed for the agenda. The focus on history does appear to be m line with his­
torical institutionalism, a theory of international relations. See Nichols, supra 
note 106. In designing his criteria for whether a subject belongs before the 
WTO, Nichols explains that they are drawn from regime theory and examines 
the characteristics of the World Trade Organization regime and applies them , 
but states that the WTO fails to constraints imposed upon the World Trade 
Organization. !d. According to Nichols, attempting such an examination 
would be an exercise in historical institutionalism. See id. 
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some analysis must be conducted of the steps and the rule-making 
process itself. The history of past rule-making is not being exam­
ined for its predictive value. How trade-related rules were negoti­
ated in the Uruguav Round does not necessarilv predict how bture ' / " 
I '  k 1 ' d b 1 d . . . 1 u nn ages can or snoul _ e approacne . Rather, exammmg t ne · ru-
guay Round _xperience is necessary because it marked a critical 
' . . G T�" h l . .  change m the :rA _ 1 apDroac1 to ru e-mabns:>0· . a .L 1 
T• . . ,.. , " "'T - l . 1 ' 1 1  . .. h . .. he 1llStC' i7 ot t he \JA 1 1s rep ete wltn tt .ustrauons ot t e m-
• • ' � .  1 1 . . d '  . TL 1 ,.. 1 . st1tut10n s EXJY>n,., 1.f', g iega� JUns 1ct1on. . ne c o re ru es tor traae m 
d ,- , . .-l · 1 ' �� k R ' " d . ' goo s w e r e  to l l oweu witn the l o .yo ouna .___. o ,.. es a1med at non-
• N b • 0 . ,  • h 1 • i u ., ,  > tar1tt l arr 1 e rs ar1d later "ll ltl r1ew� r....1 es In t .ct e .rttg,tJa;r .t\.01Jnct 
1 • 1 • ' � [ d ' , . .  , . r1 wrucn e1ther. reca oture�, areas 01. tra e never D roDerly chscwllneu 
(agriculture ;:,.nd tr,.ade in textiles) or left uncov�recl by the old defi-
. • r ' ( ,...! • ' ) 1 08 Th .. T R ' L j mtlon ot trade .,t raue 1n serv1ces . 1 e U ruguay "ound u roKe 
' 1 • ' f 1 r · 1 • " new grounc1,  n.owever, 1n the area o_ ru1e rormat1 on oecause 1t hrst 
tackled, and subsequently struggled with trade-related areas, par­
ticularly in the negotiations over intellectual property rights and 
investment. The tackling of trade-related issues in the Uruguay 
Round uncovered in stark detail some of the realities of rule­
making as conducted by an institution such as the GATT. First, 
the Gi"._ TT was regarded as an institution rooted i n  its primary mis­
sion: the l iberalization of trade . For many of the negotiating coun­
tries, this history required opposition, or at least hostility towards 
cxoanding beyond trade as it was then understood. Second, the � .. . 
GATT ·was comprised of Contracting Parties with drastically di-
vergent leveis of economic development, who vvere incli ned to 
view any expansions of GATT jurisdiction through the eyes of self­
interest.109 Any expansion of GATT rul�s to cover trade-rel ated 
108 See John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the iWO: 
Sign�ficance and Challenge, in MUL TILATER.t\L TRADE FRAMEWOR.,"<. FOR THE 
2 1ST CENTURY, supra note 14, at 5 ("[O]ne of the major  Uruguay Round ob­
jectives was to extend a GATT-type treaty rule-based discipline to three new 
subject areas: trade in services, agnculture product trade and intellectual prop­
erty matters. "L Of these three, services and imell�ctual p roperty were t \uly 
new for GAT.i . vl\ TT had always formally applied to agncultural proauct 
trade, but for a variety of reasons agriculture had escaped the GATT discipline. 
109 The best illustra.tion for this is the prolonged fipht to bring "new" is­
sues into the Uruguay Round. For discussions of the oattles between the de­
veloped and developing countries over the content of the agenda, see generally 
Carlos A. P. Biaga, 7he Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GA TT 
A Vieu; from the South, 22 VAND. J .  TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989) ; A. Jane Brad­
ley, Intellectual Pmperty R ights, Investment and Trade in Service in the Uruguay 
Round: Laying foundations, 23 STAN. J .  INT'L L. 57 (1987). 
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rules was bound to come under attack if viewed as clearly in the in­
terest of one set of GATT parties over another. Third, the GATT 
r 1 k '  . ' . rl ' 1 . d b  orocess or ru.e-m.a 'mg vtlth 1ts open-·enuea agenaa, accompame y ' ·1 · ' , .  • 1 ·  F 1 h n e ea to comprom1se over tne scope or GlsClp me o� ru es, as cre-
J l "  • ' • 1 .[ • fl atect a traun:wn whereby t ne conte�lt 01 some agreements are m �u-
, ; 1 · 1 1  J · l d O  enced oy cn01ces a1 o -vve c m ot.1ers . . . � . . . [. l. 1 • .[ 1 TR�'ll 1� . 'T'T) �I)C A bne .. exarmnan o n  or tne mstory o.:.  tne ... Lv .J and 1 rd J
agreernents illustrates these points . Both the TRI.NIS and TRIPS 
a�reemems 'J.lere so named to emohasize the only acceotabLe link-o J. .... 
· · · 
· 
·; 
" d ' d " L . .  age :  t he rules co·ve rec.l i n  e8.C t1. agree:;r�<::nL  Yl.r e te tra e-retate . nn-
• '-: ! • , . � 1 � d m m:. t he agreements to Issu.es t n ar.: "'" 'tre DY"ODerty re!atea t o  t ra e 
. . _ .. _ ... ... � .,..... , .... d ' ::.:\ r: ' r"'· --·tt• ........ . ... � ,.-· 4 -· t- · , . - '. : .. l :- ,.. l c.. . -� 1 1 1  '""T"'h �vas 1 ega1 d.e a neci.-::S.:>at 1 _i_-i t � ... '"'c)nGl t l G  n. t(j L 11 e 1 r  t...C) ffi .P h .. X!Oll. 1 . e 
ruies on trade-related inv estment lTle::tsures 2.nd trade-related prop­
erty rights were developed in similar fashions. Each agreement 1 • • � �  r d rl . 1 I b h reacned the U ru.guay Y .... oun agenua m t n e  same way. n ot � cases 
th� United States, accing as the demander in negotiations, pushed 
f · • · r '  
. 
h 
. . 
· 1 . h 1 ' d  or mcluswn o  each area m t e rmmstena meetmg t at auncne 
110 The GATT negotiating process is often described as involving trade-offs 
between the interests of the negotiating countries. See Frederick M.  Abbott, 
Cormnentary: Tl?e International Intellectual Property Order· Enters the 2ht Cen­
tury, 29 VAND. J .  TRANSNAT'L L. 471 (1996) ; John H. Jackson, GA IT and the 
Future of Intemtttional Trade Institutions, 1 8  BROOK. J. INT ' L L. 1 1 ,  1 3  (1992) . 
! I I  In the case o f  the TRIMS negotiations, the United States had been seek­
ing an expansive set of ruies while the devdooing countries viewed such laws 
"as inimical to their development i nterests and as a one-sided apJ?roach which 
failed to account for the restrictive business practices of mululateral enter­
prises. "  Price <'X Christy, supra note 14 ,  at 448. The investment measures issue 
actually reached the Uruguay Round agenda only as a compromise and was 
added to the list of "New Subjects."  See Edward M. Graham & Paul R. Krug­
man, Trade-Related Investment /vfeasures, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY 
ROUND 147, 1 50 Qeffrey Schott ed. , 1 990) . Notably, the Ministerial Declara­
tion for the Uru�ay Round provided that "following an examination of the 
operation of GA 1 T Articles related to the trade restrictive and distorting ef­
fects of trade measures, negotiations should elaborate, as appropriate, further 
provisions that may be necessary to avoid such adverse effects on trade. " Uru­
guay Round Ministerial Declaration, supra note 14 .  The declaration had s imilar 
language with respect to TRIPS: 
!d. 
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international 
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and ade­
quate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that 
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not 
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall 
aim to clarify existing GATT provisions and elaborate, as appropriate, 
ne'N ruies and disciplmes. 
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the round. i l 2 Similarly, both agreements provoked sustained resis­
tance at the time and during the negotiations themselves. Both the 
TRI:WIS and TRIPS Agreement negotiations were marked and ulti­
mately defined by the gaps between the positions of the developed 
d d 1 · · 1 13 I . .  1 1  h 1 1 . . an r eve opmg countnes .  nltla y, t e ceve opmg countnes 
wanted neither issue in the U ruguay Round, viewing neither set of 
rules as in their interest . The developing countries strongly argued 
that the GATT was not the proper institutio nal home for TRIPS, 
clair:ning that only the World Intellectual Property Organization (''"v rr- n") 1 l · · d . · 1 1 4 A h · · 1 1 � \ · W .Li..J u 1aa JUns 1ct1on. �s t e negotlat tons proceeaea, t�1e 
developed and developing countries compromised. The developed 
countries moved their negotiating objectives on TRIPS and Services 
ahead of those for TRIMS. 1 15 TRIMS emerged J.S the agreement 
1 b h "d 1 "  . d h . . . . 1 1 1 1 6 wrF:re ot s1 es lffilte t e1r 1mt1a goa s.  
Although both TRIMS and TRIPS represent exercises in trade­
related rule-making and faced similar obstacles, the agreements 
reached were quite different. The TRIMS Agreement does not rep­
resent a complete set of investment rules . Instead, TRIMS achieved 
only the following: (1) established which core GATT rules prohib-
1 12 See Graham & Krugman, supra note 1 1 1 ,  at 147-50 (regarding TRINIS) ; 
see also Michael P. Ryan, The Function-Specific and Linkage-Bargain Diplomacy of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, in Symposium, Linkage as Phe­
nomenon: A n  Interdisciplinary Approach, 19  U. PA. J .  INT'L ECON. L. 201 
(1998) (discussing the U.S.  business communities ' effortS to develop a GATT 
strategy to move intellectual property rights onto the GATT agenda) .  The 
United States also used Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to push trading 
partners in particular, to adopt "adequate" intellectual property nghts and in­
vestment legislation. This strategic use of Section 301 was aimed at setting the 
Uruguay Round agenda. See C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: 
Section 301 and the World Trade Orgpnization Dispute Settlement System ,  30 
VAND. J .  TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 2 1 8-37 (1997) .  
1 1 3  See Price & Christy, supra note 14 ,  at 445; see also 2 THE GATT 
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2072-1 19  (on 
TRL"I\1S) and 2213-75 (on TRIPS) (Terence P. Stewart ed. ,  1993) . 
1 1 4 The issue of whether WIPO rather than the GATT was the appropriate 
institutional home for intellectual property issues was not dropped from discus­
sion during the TRIPS Negotiations until 1989, three years after the Uruguay 
Round began. See Gail Evans, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue-The Making 
of an Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1 
WORLD COMPETITION 169 (1994) .  
1 1 5  See Patrick Low, Market A ccess Through Market Presence: A Look at the 
Issues, in NEW DIMENSIONS OF MARKET ACCESS IN A GLOBALIZING 
ECONOMY 49, 55 (OECD, 1995) .  
1 16 See Price & Christy, supra note 14 ,  at 45 1 .  
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ited certain investment measures;n7 (2) provided for the gradual 
phasing out of the identified non-conforming measures; 1 1 8 and (3) 
committed the WTO l\1ember states to a review and possible 
d f h . ' . . . 1 1 9 amen .ment o t e agreement w1tnm a short tlme. By contrast, 
the TRIPS Agreement is a comprehensive set of mles that dictates 
no:: only minimum international standards for intellectual property 
rights but also how 1v1ember states must align their domestic legisla-
. h. l al t 7o Th •vrro f 1 . ·cwn w ac1 Jeve tnese go s. - ... .� e w _ process _ o r  pronn..t1gatmg 
� 1 l 1 1 ·1 r 1 • • • • 1 r c-aoe-reLltea ru es appears capao1e ot producmg hmltea agreernents 
1 ' . . (�.,,� T'vif'' , ] 1  1 l , .  U 1 3X �.,<:.�t·crate ex1stmg concepts \ l .K1l D1 and equa .. q capab e o::: 
� • • • ('T'-c-o ·rs' h . . . 1 proc,;:,cmg mnovat1ve agreements t, 1 1'U .... .J ) t _at sectmg mternatwnal 
1 ' , "fy 
. b r • • d stanaards anct speCl , w a manner never etore used m tra · e  
1 f c h ! ds 1 2 1  J greerc.ents, now to guarantee en orcement ot t ose stanaar . 
The history of the TRil\IIS and TRIPS negotiations and the con­
tem:s of the resulting agreements suggest that there may be several 
preconditions for successful trade-related mle-making. The pre­
conditions constitute three levels of consensus that should be 
reached before trade-related rules can be successfully promulgated. 
These three levels of consensus do not have to be reached in  any 
1 1 7 TRIMS A�reement, supra note 4, at art . 2 (noting that member states 
are supposed to re1rain from applying a trade-related investment measure that is 
inconsistent with the GATT obhgatwns of National Treatment (Art . III), and 
rhe Prohibition on Quantitative Restrictions (Art . XI) .) . An illustrative l ist of 
TRIMS that are inconsistent with those obligations was attached as an Annex 
to the Agreement . 
1 1 8  See id. art . 5 . 1 1 9  � 'd ( l l '  f . r h . f h �ee z __ art . 9 ca mg or a review or t e operatwn o t e agreement 
within five years as well as a consideration of whether the agreement should be 
complemented with provisions on investment pol icy and competition policy) . 
f2o See TRIPS A�reement, supra note 3 ,  at J?t .  II (covering copyrights, 
trademarks, ,geographical indications, industrial desi�ns, patents, lay-out designs of integrated circuns, and protection of undisclosed information m arts. 9-39) , 
and Part III Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (arts . 41-60) . It was 
acknowledged that countries had the right to use measures to control anticom­
petitive practices in contractual licenses. !d. art. 40. 
1 2 1  The portion of the TRIPS agreement dealing with enforcement pro­
vides, for the first time, binding international obligations for the effective en­
forcement of intellectual property both internally and at the border. The im­
portance of this innovative section of the TRIPS agreement cannot be 
overstated. It will make domestic legal procedure subject to international dis­
pute settlement, not in the context of establishing an appeals procedure for the �oE:est ic court�' individ':lal cases b�t in ens':lrin� the effective operati�n of each 
W 1 0 member s domestic system m enforcmg mtellectual property nghts. See 
John Gero & Kathleen Lannan, Trade and Innovation Unilateralism v. Multilat­
eralism, 2 1  CAN.-U.S. L.J. 8 1 ,  9 1  (1995) . 
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particular order. Practically speaking, it is only after all three levels 
have been reached that an issue becomes acceptable to the interna� 
t ional community as one for trade l inkage. 
The first consensus is  on the core principles that must be vindi­
cated or rights that must be protected� Rule�making must be aware 
of its subject . To develop rules that will bind and inspire C(jmp1 i-, i b l- 1 1 • I · ' ance, there neec.s to e agreement on w 1at pro o 1e.rn ts oemg ac-
dressed and how best to address it. Illustrations from the TR1"0/(S 
and TRIPS ex.oeri.ence m ay prove illuminatin?0•  One reason v hv [ .... ,  
commentators have described the TRIMS Agreement as 8. fai lure is 
b • ' 'd d I [ h • • • 1 '  ecause l t  ch not a Ciress many 01 L e mvesunen.t 1ssues ra1se•j by 
l • •  - • 1 c: 
1 h . 1 . ., ,-tne U mteo '-"'tates ana ot �er cap1ta -exporong scues as key aspects ot . 
. 1 7 /  Th h .  f . . . ' mvestment p rotection. -- e 1story o the negotiatiOns revea.ls 
that the l in�ited scope of the TRIMS rules can be traced to the uni­
verse o! in:es�ment rights and115rotections not be�
��g _c�nc}usiv�l.y 
determmed pnor to the round. - By contrast the 1 KIPJ 1''-l egotlat­
ing Group had the benefit of a well-defined universe of intellectual 
property rights as developed by existing i nternational intellectual 
property agreements and the efforts of \X!IP0. 124 The TRIPS nego­
tiating group was thereby capable of reaching the i ssue of what in­
tellectual property rights were and hq_w they should be protected 
I • 1 f" b f . • J2) C1unng tne 1 rst p .ase o negotiatiOns. 
The second consensus that must be achieved is about how the 
issue or area is l inked to trade. No issue has ever been accepted for 
study by the GATT /\V'TO, for working group examination, or as 
an agenda item for a negotiating round unless trade-relatedness was 
offered as a justification.  There is no common understanding of 
how trade-relatedness must be established. 1 26 Clearly, if rules have 
122 See Jonathan Startup, A n  Agenda for International Investment, in THE 
NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS 1 89 (OECD ed., 1 994) ;  Wong, su­
pra, note 9. 
1 2 3  See Price & Christy, supra note 14, at 455 (comparing the TRIPS experi· 
ence with that of TRIMS) . 
· 
124 See id. ; see generally Ryan, supra note 1 1 2  (arguing that the TRIPS 
Agreement was possible because it built upon the "function-specific" work al­
ready done by the intellectual property community, and because l inkao-e­
barga�n diplomacy was available in the Uruguay Round to facilitate trade-offsJ. 
12' THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTiATING HISTORY, supra 
note 1 13 ,  at 2265-67 ; but see Ryan, supra note 1 12 (pointing out that it was actu­
ally the creation of the Draft Composite Text in 1991 by the chair of the nego· 
tiatin� committee that crystallized the form of the final agreement) . 12 See Nichols, supra note 104, at 733-34 (acknowledging that there are 
"many possible indicia of substantial effect" on trade and that 1t cannot simply 
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the capacity for liberalizing or  distorting trade, they would be 
trade-related. The GATT has frequently expanded its jurisdiction 
to include nJles on government practices that act as barriers to 
trade. The newer subj ects proposed for linkage, such as labor and 
investment rights, however, do not fall neatly into this characteri­
zation.  In the case of both labor and investment , new rules would 
• 1 d • r £ h · · · · 1 prov1.ae a stan an:i or treatment 10r L1ose part1c1patmg m tne crea-- . r l · '  • 1 • , b 1 • • · • r · · uon or tr3.aable goods ana serv1ces . ht est , sucn rules mtght rac1 h-
, 'T'L . � r h.  J I I ' ...-, tate t race . 1 Here 1s preceGent ror t 1s type 01 t racw-re ,<tteo ness . .ny 
. . . � - - � -- � " h r- A"'�f , 1 [  negotw.t1n2: the l KH') .t"..g;reement, tLe t..:r 1 went t.)eyonG i.OCUS·· 
• .._.. •j • •j L· � • • (" '- • • . 1 77 ! J • • wf", on l tberallzatwn ot t rade or barners to trade . - h .. c:op tmg m-
.. .. � 
p .... .... ,...... n ... t-- ,.. J ri ·  ..... -1 n ,- 1  1. t' "': -;  ... + · 1 · ..... ,... d�- :lo a-� '- ra :r\ , ..... r 'n . .... ... . v,�.,LL.eLt S t ::J.L ,�dl us J u -1 c "'p pea, to 1aC1 1ta.te L a  e iyl ' '-- '· '  ,., , ,,_._ 1s 
understood about the economic inter-linkage between trade and 
t - ;-c.· · o- -, rl ; · .o>r-:- ; v=•�j· Pnt 1 2 8  B' t <'t th a' n'· ; �  .,! , · ; _  , o , -� I L..,L �,.r..._ ._ , .n . ...  _ ,m_,_.t. . y con . ra,_ ,  1 e a ot. c .v n  c ,. rr . .J.n. 
d 1 • 1 f 1 b · h r . , . mum st;:;_n- arcs m tne area o a or ng1 ts may or may not rac111tate 
trade given what is currently known about the economics . Rather, 
the creation of trade-related labor rules would arguably legitimize 
trade and make it fair trade. 129 Justif.ting \VTO jurisdiction under 
be l imited to a statistical measurement of trade flows; at the macro !e·vel , it is 
possible that there are issue that cannot be depicted through stati�;tical evidence, 
but whose resolution is critical to international trade governance) ; see also 
Leary, supra note 7 ,  at 220. 
It is argued that only "trade-related" issues, and not issues such as workers' 
rights, should have a place in trade negotiations (i .e . ,  note the use of the terms 
"trade-related" intellectual property to justify the inclusion of inteliectual prop­
erty issues in Uruguay Round negotiations) . The categorizat ion of "trade­
related issues,"  however, appears to depend on the eyes of the beholder. 
127 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, in Symposium, 
Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach , 19 U. PENN. J . INT'L 
ECON.  L. 201 (1998) (describing the TRIPS Agreement) . 
128 See supra Section 1 .2 . 1 . 1 . 1 .  (discussing the relationship between trade 
and investment) . 
129 See Langille, supra note 10 1 ,  at 236 (pointing out the long-held assump­
tion of trade theory, that there is a natural or non-controversial mode of eco­
nomic ordering and that distortions or perversions of this "normalcy" can be 
detected, measured and taken into account by trade theory) . But this is not the 
case . This is why the debate over fair trade is so intractable. There is no way 
for trade policy or its economic principles to be insulated from the political is­
sues at stake. Fair trade is free trade'? destiny. That is, once governmental ac­
tion or non-action in labor pol icy (tor example) is problematized a potential 
su�sidy, then there is not alte:native to engagin_g in the debate �bou�c , the appro­pnate scope of market regulatwn (of labor relatwns, for exampie). Jd.. 
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such a theory of trade-relatedness, however, strikes at the hean of 
h ff. · d , ' L d · 130 t e e· 1c1ency mo el or tne tra e reg1rne. 
�I'h h. d ' ' r ' b h ' f 1 · 1  e t 1  1 r  levei o consensus tnat must e reac eo  o r  muru .at-
eral rule-making concerns how it should be realized and enforced. 
Multilateral rule-making takes place in an institut ional frame·v.10rk 
and requires institutional oversight and enforcement o nce the rules 
are negotiated. Before reaching this consensus, the international 
community m.ust be convinced that there is a need fo r cooperzrtion 
d • . 1 ' ' • • b d • • h I • or coor matwn) anc. that the 1ssue 1s est ealt Wlt at tne l ntt rn�<· 
· ., 1 � l r · � · .C • ·� 1 uonal level .  - - 1,_; 1ven the nature and reality o.�. mvestmen t  an(1 l?.-
., t 1 • • 1 . t' 1 1 '  • 1 1 1 bor,  ana tlv� current 1nternatwnal regtme or cea1 1ng w 1 t n  GOU l ;  
1 • ' 1-. • • 1 . 1 tnere 1s an 2 :-;;ument that sucu 1nternat10na cooperation ano coot--·=> 
dination is necessary. Assumi ng that an internatio nal solution is 
required, concrete issues of the proper i nstitution to conduct the 
1 k .  1 h ,- h . r ' ru e-ma. mg ana t. e proper enrorcement mec amsm tor any :rules 
that might be developed, must be addressed. Selecting an institu­
tion (along with its enforcement methods) for rule-making, to a 
large extent, dictates the form, scope, and content of the interna­
t ional rules . \'V'hat is less clear is what kind of international coop­
eration is needed. Does the area present the case for one exclusive 
jurisdi ction by one institution, for shared jurisdict ion , o r  for true 
collaboration? 
2. 2. f-low Investrru;at and Labor R ights Satisfy or Fail to Satisfy 
the Preconditions for Trade-Related Rule-Making 
2. 2. 1. First Consensus 
Both investment and labor satisfy, in some fashion,  the first 
consensus by identifying what core rights or principles need to be 
protected. With regard to investment , there has been an extensive 
attempt to develop a comprehensive understanding of the rights 
130 Dunoff reaches this conclusion by indicating that as 'trade and' disputes 
increase, the efficiency model 's welfare for maxim1zing calculus does not cor­
rectly account for these non-economic values. Dunoff, supra note 127. 
131  The 'Y/TO Secretariat Report on Trade and Investment argues t hat a 
lack of rule and policy coherence, both of which exist in the investment regime, 
pose a "danger to security and stability, which are basic goals of trade and in­
vestment agreements." TR..<\DE AND FDI, supra note 46, at 44; see also Nichols, 
supra note 104, at 738-40 (setting this out as one of the criteria for j udging 
whether the WTO should have jurisdiction over a subject) . 
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. 0 l ' b  . . . 1 3?  and protectwns necessary to create a 1 eral mvestment regime. -
The views of the capital exporting states have coalesced around sev­
eral crucial ideas, bui lding from the earliest international invest­
ment agreements, the Friendship,  Commerce and Navigation trea­
ties, 133 throul:!:h the European and American bilateral investment 
!3¥ d 0 ' 0 1 f£ h 1 � 1 agreements, an mto regwna e 10rts, sue as _tne J.:nergy C urter 
� . h N ,\ -�,..,., \ . , 1 3 )  -rc . J: [ 1 reaty and t, e n.t' 1 r\. mvestment chapter. _r' Jrst, LOr a set 01 
international investment rules to be effective, there must be an ex-. . f' 0 ° - ,- 0 " 1 3 6  c d ' d '  0 1 ° pansive de Imtlon ot 'mvestment. .:.:>econ , the  tra 1t10na_ m-
vestment problem of discrimi1,1ation against foreign e<�pital and in-
1 • � d ! J ?  �rh . . .- . . L. vestments must oe <J.dcresse . 
· 
_ .Ird, a core ot mvestment ng11ts 
must be inciuded in any investment regime such as the ,ri�hts of es­
tablishment, and operat ion .  Investment protections, 1 3 '  such as a 
thorough standard for expropriation, adequate con:1pensacion, and 
the right to transfer funds, should be i ncluded as wel l .  Whether the 
capital importing countries share the view· rhat all of these elements 
are required at all ,  much less in the form represented by an agree­
ment such as NAFTA, is doubtful .  During the Uruguay Round, 
there was active opposition to such ideas and the .N1AI negotiations 
�y th�9
0ECD have had only limited developing country participa­
tion. 
132 See 1996 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 161-200 
(compiling the policy issues (i . e . ,  whether there should be a comprehensive 
multilateral framev;ork) as well as a surveying all the existing international 
rules) . 
133 See Price & Christy, supra note 14 ,  at 440. 
134 See generally KENNETH J .  VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE (1992) ;  see also 1996 WORLD INVESThlENT 
REPORT, supra note 25, at 134-47 (comparing existing BITs) . 
135 The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 32  I.L.M. 
605, 639-48 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
136 Compare Model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. l (b) ,  reproduced 
in 1 Basic Documents of International Law 655 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. 
Brand eels. ,  1990) , with NAFTA, supra note 135 ,  art. 1 139. 
137  The non-discrimination issues are addressed by adopting National 
Treatment and MFN provisions . Most b ilateral agreements have both. See 
TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46, at 23 .  Chapter 1 1  of NAFT A extends the Na­
tional Treatment and MFN standards to pre- and post-establishment as_eects of 
an investment. See NAFTA, supra note 135 ,  arts. 1 102(1), (2) , 1 103 (1), (2) . 
138 See 1996 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 1 89-92. 
139 See Joanna R. Shelton, Symposium on the MAl (presented on Oct. 20, 
1997) , available at OECD/Jv!AJ Symposium in Cairo, (visited May 7, 1998) at 
< http:! /www .oecd.org/ daf/ cmis/ mail shelton.htm > (noting that those non­
OECD Member states that expressed interest in acceding to the MAI, including 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
674 U. Pa. J. lnt 'l Econ. L. [Vol 19 :2  
In the case of labor,  a review of the recent multilateral disctlS­
sions and negotiations, 140 as well as scholarly efforts, reveals tha� a 
. 1 1 · b h · 1 b · L 1 4 1  consensus i S  aeve opmg a out w a t  constitutes core a or ngnts. 
Although different sources exist from wh ich these rights are drawn, 
such as human rights t reaties, domestic legislation with social 
clauses and ILO Conventions, a small list of rights has increasingly 
been identified as enumerating core rights . That core list includes: 
the freedom to associate, the freedom to bargain collectively, the 
orohibic ion of forced labor, discrimination in emDloyment, and ex-' 
1 · · [ + h . , 1 • b 14?  c· · ·' · · p ortatlve .lonns oL cr 11a la or. - 1ven t h e  comprehens1ve nature 
' . ' d  . ' . 
b 
. 
1 b . h \.- ' . 1 '  1 • •  ot what cou J �_  be descn ed as a or ng ts, w,uch cover aLl reallnes 
• L ' 1 r bl "  h f 1 .b . 1 . , . ot tue •;vo rKp1ace rrom esta 1s. ment o t ile � as1c re,.at !Onshrp, to 
wages, to  'Horking conditions and safety, a recognition of this list is 
a neces sary first step towards any contemplated set of internation­
ally mand-ated labor rights . Not all ILO Mernber states have yet 
ratified the conventions which establish these rights; nevertheless, 
they are among the most ratified. 1 43 The core list has grown from a 
recognition that there is a minimum level of labor standards. The 
freedoms to associate and to bargain collectively are seen as the nec­
essary procedural rights for the labor force. 144 Without the right to 
meet and discuss common issues and concerns and gain leverage in 
establishing the terms of employment with management, workers 
will be vrithout the ability to influence labor standards. The prohi­
bition of forced labor is necessary to enshrine properly the 
k > • h 1 h "  k 145 Th 1 " 1  · • r t •  • • wor er s ng-<Lt to cnoose 1s wor . .e pronwrtwn ot. mscnml-
nation lim.its the ability of employers and governments to treat 
workers differently on the basis of some characteristic unrelated to 
Argentina, Brazil ,  Chile, Hong Kong, China and Slovakia, were invited to be­
come observers in the Negotiating Group) . 
140 See supra notes 7 and 1 1  concerning recent efforts by the ILO Govern­
ing Body regarding core labor rights. 
141  See Langille, supra note 7; OECD STUDY , supra note 44. However, 
there is no universal agreement. See generally Leary, supra note 26 (arguing for a 
shorter l ist) ; R. Michael Gadbaw & Michael T. Medwig, Multinational Enter­
prises and Intemational Labor Standards: Which Way jar Devel'!J!ment and jobs, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL l RADE 14 1 ,  153 
(Lance A. Compa & Stephen F.  Diamond eels . ,  1996) (arguing for a different set 
of rights altogether) . 142 i" 
69 78 1 • .)ee supra notes - ana accompanymg text. 
143 O D See EC STUDY, supra note 44, at 33-36. 
144  Langille, supra note 7, at 32. 
145  See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying eotes. 
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their abilities. 1 46 The prohibition of exploitative child labor is 
aimed at restricting, if not curtai l ing, child labor either by establish­
ing minimu� standards o r  by limiting any activity that resembles ' d i 1 h7 torce 1aoor. 
2. 2. 2. 
',.X!ith regard t o  developing the second consensus , investment 
and l2bor differ significantly on how an issue relates to trade. 
� - '  . . h . f d 1 •  1 [ l i:ere lS a growmg consensus on t e economics o t ra .e 1 1 r1 Kage J. o r  
irrves trnent., as witnessed by studies and the numerous attempts to 
cre8.ce trade-related investment rules . 148 Neverthel ess, the imerna­
tional co mmunity has not yet been abl e  to agree upon the need for, 
o r  t he content of a truly international investment regime . The po-­
litical reality of the G i\. TT and its manifestation in the Uruguay 
T) i l 1 J • • ' 1 1  fl d d 1 1 1 f:'\,ottnct p roauceo. 1 tffi1ted or structura y-r av.re tra e relateG rules, 
such as the TRIMS Agreement and the GATS, respectively. 149  De­
spite t hese flawed attempts to create some type of  trade-related in · 
vestment regime, the WTO has not abandoned the field. During 
the Singapore 'Ministerial,  the member states agreed to establish a 
Working Party on Trade and Investment. The WTO Secretariat 
also issued its report on Trade and Investment. Although the 
'-XI orking Party has begun its work, which focuses not only on 
trade-relatedness (i .e . ,  the economics of investment and trade) but 
also noticeably on the relationship between trade and investment 
and development, its agenda suggests a lengthy p rocess focusing on 
educating }\1ember states about investment and its ramifications. 
Conspicuously absent fro m  the current goals of  the Working Party 
is any mission to modify TRHv1S or the promulgate new trade­
related investment rules . 
Regionally, the OECD has moved ahead of the WTO by work­
ing towards the MAL Given its membership, the OECD is sensi­
tive about the relationshio between the MAI and the "wTO's trade­
related investment rules .
... 
Consequently, the OECD Member states 
1 46 !d. 
1 47 See generally Diller & Levy, supra note 78. 
148 See generally TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46, at 23-37. 
149 For a discussion of the limits of TRIMS, see supra notes 1 1 1-47 and ac­
companying text. For a discussion of the GATS limitations see generally 
Hoekman, supra note 9 at 1 77-83;  Richard B. Self, General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, in THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 2 1ST 
CENTURY, supra note 14,  at 523 . 
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have acknowledged that the OECD must work with the \;y]'O, 
and has formulated MAI obligations which are consistent with the 
'VT1'0 1 1 50  W rDlCS . 
By contrast, there is no consensus on how labor  rights relate to 
trade. Those favoring linkage and those opposing it disagree r?­
garding the economics of t he l inkage of labor rights to tradt: .  l ::> l 
Moreover, these groups also disagree about the value and utiEty of 
international trade-related rule-making in this area. 
2. 2.3. Third Consensus 
Investment and labor also differ regarding the third co nsensus . 
They differ on how international rule-making regarding each are;:·. 
should be realized and enforced. With regard to b oth ar.eas, ·the 
WTO now has a limited or non-existent role desoite suggestions 
h . 1. 1 ' ' h l k ' . . . 15 1 r,.;h \Y(TI t a t  1 t  S11ou d be t e ru e-ma mg mstltutwn. - 1 1  e -. "l ·�' com-
mands this attention because it is currently regarded as a competent 
and powerful institution. The Uruguay Round succeeded in replac­
ing the GATT with a membership organization that required states 
to adopt an expansive set of l egal commitments and t o  submit to 
what is perceived to be an effective dispute settl ement system. 
Given its already extensive j urisdiction and mandate to promulgate 
additional rules, the \'\'T O  is competent to negot iate new trade­
related rules. 153 Moreover, the WTO's Dispute Sett lement ·under·· 
standing is equipped with the most effective method for enforcing 
its obligations, 1::>4 which is an adjudicative dispute settlement sys-
1 55 , k d b h h . d . 156 D tern oac. er . y t . e power to aut onze tra e sanct10ns .  L e-
spite or because of these institutional attributes, however, the 
150 See infra Section 3 . 1 .  for a discussion of the MAI design and core prin­
ciples. 
1 5 1  See Srinivasan, supra note 44; Van Liemt, supra note 1 0 1 .  
1 52 d . See supra note 1 1  an accompanymg notes. 
153 See Nichols, supra note 1 04, at 727-28 .  
154 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes , Apr. 15 ,  1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multmational Trade Negotiations, Annex 2, app .  l , in THE RESULTS 
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4·04 
(1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]. 
155 See Taylor, supra note 1 12 ,  at 242-49, 296 & n.399 Oisting all the major 
discussions of the adjudicative nature of the DSU System) . 
156 See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 1 54, at art. 22 
(recognizing that the Dispute Settlement Understanding authorizes sanctions 
only if the offending party in  a WTO dispute fails to withdraw the non­
conforming measure pomted out by a WTO panel report) . !d. art . 22.3.  
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�(ITO may never be the institution to promulgate comprehensive 
international rules on investment or  labor rights. In the investment 
area, it is clear that the WTO has jurisdiction because it b as invest­
ment and investment related agreements . The WTO, however, 
will not be the first institution to complete a set of international in­
vestment rules . Instead, it appears that the OECD, if it does finish 
the n�w delayed negotiations, will  promulgate such an agree-
bl c . fl f h . . . . . 1 • mem. ertam consequences ow rom t 1s mst!tutwnal cn01ce. 
The OECD, as an inst itution comprised of similarly situated coun­
tries, is developing a MAI that represents its members vie·,;vs racher 
than the compromise of competing visions that marks a \XfTO 
agreement . The OECD also has freedom regarding t he form of the 
agreement (a free standing treaty) and how to enforce its obligations 
(through the state to state methods, as well as private investor ver­
sus state methods) . This is not available to the \V'TO unless it 
d 1 1 . . 158  d c 1 59 a opts severa a teratwns to  1ts current structure an wcus. 
157 As noted earlier, the WTO Working Party on Trade and Investment 
lacks any mandate beyond reviewing the linkage issue. The WTO would move 
ahead of the OECD only if the MAl is never completed, which is a prospect 
that currently seems unlikely. 
· 
158 In the current structure of the WTO, all Member states are subject to all 
major obl igations. This in turn means that any violation of a WTO obligation, 
whether it is a GATT 1994, TRIPS, TRIMS or GATS oblio-ation, is sub;ect to 
the Di�ute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") . Because the DSU was estab­
lished for sovereign-sovereign complamts only, the WTO would have to alter 
the structure of the DSU to offer an additional type of dispute settlement for 
investment disputes if the investor-state disputes are to be kept directly under 
WTO supervis10n.  See Edward M. Graham, Direct Investment and the Future of 
the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: CHAL­
LENGES AHEAD 205, 2 12  (1996) (suggesting alternative ways to establish stand­
ing for investors) . 
Changing the structure of the DSU in such a fashion, however, raises the 
issue of why investment disputes should be treated differently than other trade 
and trade-related disputes. The answer that the rights of an individual investor 
are involved is not sufficient because the rights of mdividual holders of intellec­
tual property rights are implicated by the TRIPS Agreement, as are those of 
service suppliers in the GATS, and yet they lack access to the DSU System. 
Private party-sovereign investment disputes can be characterized as contract 
disputes. Such a characterization would differentiate them from intellectual 
property rights which are benefits conferred by a state. Of course, the other 
optiOn would be to allow such disputes to be handled through ICSID Arbitra­
tion or ad hoc arbitration and not _give the WTO true junsdiction.  See id. 
(noting that a U.S. position on the efforts is needed by the WTO) . 
159 The expansion of the WTO to allow for private parties to have access is 
a controversial idea, even if it is potentially meritorious. See Andrea K. Schnei­
der, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual R ights in International Trade 
Organizations, in Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon: A n  Interdisciplinary Ap-
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The completion of the MAI as a free standing treaty wilL if it 
can gain membership outside the OECD itself, provide two inter­
national institutions with overlappir1g comperence regarding in­
vestment rules. \V'hether and how the r·wo institmions can coordi­
nate their efforts to implement and enforce the rules will become 
major issues. Ultimately, this dual competence could lead to a 
WTO decision to adopt the MAI as a beginning, eve n if not as a ba­
sis for its own Trade-related Investment Agreement . 
In the labor rights area it is fai rly clear that the ".Y!TO has no 
role to play in the short term. The S ingapore Ivlinisterial Declara­
tion effectively assigned jurisdict ion o v e r  labor rights to the ILO. 
��h ·· r 0 1 1 . h , . . . .c , , . 1 l e L_. now nas to grapp e w1t1- havmg the 1ssue 01 trade nnr\.age 
returned to it .  Initial moves tow<>.rds expanding the ILO power 
further to monitor labor rights proteccion were stymied in the 1 997 
International Labor Conference . Ho wever, in November, the 
Governing Body of the ILO agreed to allow a director-general led 
effort to increase ILO powers regarding core labor rights to be put 
on the agenda for the 1998 International Labor Conference. 16° For 
the near future, labor rights advocates will have to see 1f the ILO 
can better protect fundamental labor rights . If that organization 
fails to address the issue in some way, it is l ikely that p ressure to 
move labor rights onto the 'WTO agenda, at least frorn the United ,... ' 1 1  16 1  :_,rates, w1 not cease. 
3 .  TRANSFORMING EXISTING AND PROPOSED RULES INTO 
TRADE-RELATED RULES 
3. 1. Trade and Investment 
Different models for an investment regime exist1 including the 
bilateral i nvestment agreements, APEC guidelines, '62 the existing 
proach, 19  U. PENN . l INT'L ECON. L. 201 (1998) (arguing that orivate access 
would bring a level of legitimacy to WTO dispute settlement) . 
• 
160 See Singapore Minister Urges, supra note 10.  
! 6 1  !d. 
162 The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation forum issued Non-Binding 
Investment Principles in November 1994 that dealt with, among other things, 
transparency, national treatment, investment incentives, performance require­
ments, exr.rol?riation and compensation standards, repatriation of funds (and it:> 
convenibtlity) and dispute settlement. See TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46, at 
29. 
I 
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n·� ·/>D d - 1 63 NAF�rA 1 64 d th TRT"A '15 1 65 d r D 1"'5 166 UL'___, co es, · 1 , an e ..uv anr '-h "-
Agreements . During the MAI drafting p rocess, all  of these mod­
els were reviewed and studied for common principles and design . 
The iviAI is not completely based on any of these models.  In 
most cases, there were limitations as to the scope of the agreement 
(either in the definitions or number of commitments) o r  'Nith 
their  enforcement mechanism. 167 Nevertheless, i t  is fairlv clear 
that the MAl has been strongly influenced by its model.;_ The 
most obvious m odels appear to be the GATT (and the GATS) for 168 d NA"j::;�r II r' h 1 � f ' ' r structure an -'- 1 .n, 1_, apter 1 or substance anci enrorce-
• , 169 ment mechamsm. - ' )\ '1A� bl  . G II T'..,.., d l -- 1\ � .-.  ln many ways the 1v' .l resem es the n l an t11e (_7n .. 1 0--
the framework agreements of the WTO. A framework agree­
ment for trade rules is one which sets out core general principles 
(subject to some general and other specific exceptions) and a proc­
ess for achieving the ultimate goals of the agreement . The trade 
framework agreements contemplate progress over time with each 
new negotiating round reaching and fixing a new level of com­
mitments. In the case of the GATT 1947, the core principles 
were the Most Favored Nation170 and National Treatment Provi-
. 171  d h . d h . 1 'T' 'ff s1ons an  t . e process was conta1ne 1n t1 e art1c"e on 1 an 
163 OECD Code on the Liberalization of Capital Movements and the 
OECD Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations. For a survey 
of these Codes, see OECD, INTRODUCTION TO THE CODES OF LIEERJi.Ll­
ZATION (PARIS, 1 987) .  
164 See NAFTA, supra note 135 .  
165 See TRIM:S Agreement, supra note 4. 
166 G T See A S, supra note 14.  
167 See the analysis of these models in TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46, at 
25-28. 
16s The GATT and GATS are framework agreements. See id. at 35 .  
Like the GATT before it, the  GATS i s  a framework designed to permit 
the progressive liberalization of trade in services through further negotiations. 
Indeed, the GATS contains a built-in commitment in Article XIX to continue 
to negotiate liberalization through successive rounds of negotiations with the 
first such negotiation scheduled to begin no later than the year 2000, and to 
continue penodically afterwards . 
169 The scope of the MAI, its provision on performance requirements, and 
its adoptton of the two forms of dispute settlement appear to be heavily pat­
terned after similar NAFT A provisions. 
170 " A  TT 2 I I..J[\ , supra note , at art. . 
171 !d. art. III. 
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- . d
' ! 7? 1�' r 
k f h ' L l  1 Bm mg. - _ he tramewor orrnat as proven remarkao y worl<:-
able for eliminating tariffs and other barriers to trade . In fact, the 
success of the GATT in lowering tariff barriers ultimately re­
vealed other barriers to trade and subsequently led countries to 
push for other agreements to deal with areas that the frame work 
did not cover but which clearly impacted on trade , the  non-tariff 
I . o�trners.  
During the Ur..1guay Round, the GATS was also designed, us­
ing the GATT model as a basis ,  as a framework agreemem. The 
� ' ""['r' h 1 . . 1 l 7J 1 d 1 d' . Crh. __ � uas one genera pnnClp.e,  sene u e serv1ce sector corrJ� 
· 1 7  ·t • · - · 1 ·  b , · · 1 I )  mltme nts and a commitment t o  progressive .t eral1zao on. 
Designing an agreement for t rade in services as a frame-'llrork 
agreement, however, created several problems. The contracting 
parties were not able to adopt completely either lv:[FN o r  ].\Ja­
tionai Treatment . In addition, the services schedules submitted 
by many countries were considered to be so i nadequate by others 
. 1 . f.. . . . d 1 76 T 1 d that <rter, sector speC! 1c negotlatwns were reqmre . _ nese e-
partures from the GATT model have led many to view the 
GATS as  structurally flawed. The struggle t o  fit services trade 
172 Article II was conceived as a device for getting the contracting parties to 
liberalize trade by conducting an ongoing process of negotiations to lower 
worldwide tariffs. For this process to work the contracting part ies had to nego­
tiate over levels of tariff reduction ,  submit country-specific schedules \vhich il­lustrated those commitments, and commit to bind (or keep in place) those tar­
iffs or tariffs of comparable amount . Crucial to the conce_pt ot binding is that 
the countries agreed both to a standstill ,  not increasing tanffs (unless an excep­
tion applied) ,  as well progressive l iberaLization of tariff commitments. See id. 
<J.rt. II. 
173 GATS, supra note 14,  at art . ll (Most-Favored-Nation) . Although the 
GATS does have MFN as a core principle, it is subject to exemRtions contained in an Annex to the agreement. Moreover, unlike the GAT _._- , the Uruguay 
Round negotiators did not establish national treatment as a general prinCiple. 
Instead, it falls under the section on specific commitments by Member states, 
which means that l imitations might be placed on the principles for any service 
sector for which a committee is made. See id. art. XVII. 
174 !d. arts. XVI, XVII, XVill. 
175 !d. art. XIX. 
176 See Self, supra note 149, at 546-50 (briefly discussing the extended neoo­
tiations required for financial services, and basic telecommunications) .  In addi­
tion, there was dissatisfaction with the "positive list" approach taken for sched­
uling commitments. Under this method, countries on!y scheduled the sectors 
they were willing to l iberalize and, subseq_uently, l imits were placed on those 
l iberalization commitments. Any sector lett off a schedule was not ooen to lib-
eralization. 
• 
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into such a rnodel could raise some issues about the :MAI attempt 
at a framework investment agreement . 
t .. 1 1 ' 1 1 "  0 1 77 . 0 T 11e JVIAI lega  rll es ancl o o  1gat10ns are con tamed m the 
following parts of the treaty: Section I is a lengthy preamble 
which sets out the goals of the treaty; Section II sets out the scope 
and applic;:J.tion, which defines investor, investment and the geo­
graphical scope of appllcation; Section III addresses the treatment 
f .  , . 1 .  1 r h · · , f o mvestors anet ;nves trrv=;nts, wmcn .1sts t e core pnnop"es o na-
• ')> - �1\.-' d 179 d • L • tional t reatrnentj 1JLt-· l � an transparency · v an other 1 nvestor 
rights 179; Secc1on f\,/ discusses investor protection; Section ·v deals 
with dispute set tlement ; Section VI codifies exceptions and s«.fe­
guards; Section V II is the financial services provision, -vvhich is a 
1 l " h · 1 1 ! , . r · carve our crup-cer wmc creates speCla ru es 1 0 r  th1s type or m-
vestmem; Secrion VIII deals with taxation; and Section IX articu­
lates country specific exceptions, which will ultimately be com­
prised of the schedules of each signatory when negotiations are 
finished. 
The core concepts regarding the treatment of i nvestors and 
investments are National Treatment and Most Favored Nation. 180 
Aside from the use of the legal term of art, these two MAl provi­
sions are worded exactly the same as one another. The general 
principles of the MAl are, therefore, the same as those of the 
GATT. Legal terms that focus on non-discrimination such as na­
tional treatment and Most Favored Nation, however, take on dif­
ferent meaning when aligned to the specific goals of a commercial 
agreement. In the trading regime, the crucial form of non-
177 Other portions of the MAI are devoted to the Relationship to other In­
ternational Agreements (Section X), Implementation and Operation (Section 
XI) , and Final Provisions (Section XII) . 
178 The WlAI, l ike newer trade agreements, has raised transparency to the 
level of core principles. 
1 79 Other investor rights soecified by the M..AI include temporary entry for 
investors, a prohibition of nat�onality restrictions for executives, managers, of­
ficers and board members, prohibitions on performance requirements. See !v!AJ 
Negotiating Text, supra note 8 ,  at Section III. 
1 80 The National Treatment provision is as follows: 
I d. 
Each Contracting Party shal l  accord to investors of another Contract­
ing Party and to their investments, treatment no less favourable than 
the treatment it accords (in l ike circumstances) to its own investors 
and their investments with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and 
sale or other disposition of investments. 
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discrimination is between trading partners . As a result , lviFN is 
the cornerstone of the GATT. By contrast, i n  an investment 
agreement , the m ost common discrimination is against outside 
investors or investments. Consequently, the most imponant con­
cept in the lv1AI is National Treatment. Using t hese concepts to 
1 • h • f '  1 1 I exp am ow mvestment ana mvestors must oe treatect, t1owever,  
necessarily involv-es specifying some level of investment rights. In 
the .IY1AI, the two gene ral orinciples are linked to the broadest 
"b l  r · ' - · h 1 3 1  7 • • 1 poss1 e scope o t mvest ment ng ts. 1nvestors are g1ven n ghts 
to establish, acquire, expand, operate, manage, maintain ,  use, en·· 
• 1 1  , · 1 • r · · r 1 · 1 ;oy, seu, or otne r\vlse d1spose or mvestments m a rasmon no .ess ( b' h I ( ) • l 0 ) 1avora · 1� �- an that or a country s natwna s or any other country s . . , g ,  T d . 1 b . l ' h otlze n s .  · - 1.nvestors an . mvestments are a so to e entlt.eci to t e 
' · . 1 M"FN 1 83 Th. 1 . . . better natwna treatment or . . 1s atter p rovrswn 1s 
important since any derogation from national treatment would 
still provide the investor with the same treatment offered to other 
outsiders. 
Given the breadth of rights established by the national t reat­
ment and MFN provisions of the MAI, they cannot be viewed in 
isolation from the list of country-specific exceptions. The MAI 
employs the negative list approach for the exceptions schedules 
where any exceptions that a country plans to take must be sched­
uled. 1 84 In its current form, the MAl has opted for strong general 
principles and many exceptions. 1 85 The list of country-�pecific 
1 8 1  The 1\I.AI text recognizes that true national treatment is not possible in 
some areas, such as financial services and taxation, and so it has taken a carve­
out approach with respect to these concepts. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra 
note 8 ,  at Sections VII-Financial Services and VIII-Taxation. See also OECD, 
MA l Briefing (or non-OECD Countries: Scope of the MAl (Sept. 1 7, 1997) 
(presentation by Xavier Musca, Treasury Directorate, Ministry for the Econ­
omy and Finance, France) < http:/ hvww.oecd.org/ daf/ cmis/ mail musca.htm > 
("Total and uncondition;J liberalism of international investment could lead to 
economic destabilization and would have been counterproductive. The MAl 
negotiators thus established limits to its scope of applicatwn. ") . 
182 !d. The scope of the MAI, therefore, gives investors and investments 
pre- and post-establishment rights. 
183 See id. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another 
Partr �n� to their investments the better of th.e treat�ent required by Articles 
1 . 1  (Natwnal Treatment) and 1 .2 (1v1FN), whichever 1s the more favorable to 
those investors or investments. See id. 
184 This is in contrast to the GATS positive l ist approach that had been 
heavily criticized. See Hockman, supra note 9 .  
185 See Sol Picciotto, Linkage in International Investment Regulat ion and 
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, p resented at the Linkage as Phe-
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exceptions still being negotiated is several times the size of the 
treaty itself Negotiations slowed over the need for OECD states 
to find acceptable levels of country-specific exc�ptions, as well as 
to determine what the other general exceptions 1 �  will b e  allowed, 
and their form. Even more controversial has been the fight over 
• h ' l l  b • r l 1 . h f whether t _ere w1 1 e exceotwns tor sucn tmngs , sue as ones or ' . . � 1 87 l 1 • . d reaionai econom1c mtegrat1on arrangements anc cu.tura l m• us-
.c 1 8 8  � tnes.  
� . . h 1 1 '  1 1 1 txtenstve exceptiOn sc1 eau m ob, as ·viet as carve-outs, are a so 
. 
� h , . .  ' j • 1 ' d  necessary g1ven w ._ at unconditiOnal nat l O D 3J trearment wou.l 
m.ean in the irrvestment cont ext . Investment measures tend to be 
internal . Some, but not all ,  of a country's rules that limit or re­
strict investment are designed to discriminate. Other measures 
. d ·  . ' r • •  r h  1 h are ;::ur:ne' ai ensunng t.t1e proper tunctwmng ot t11e marKet, t e 
economic security of the country, or efforts by  governments to 
' . . . d . 1 1 ·  1 1 8 9  T . l acn1eve certam m ustna po 1cy goa s .  rue natwna treatment 
would mean treating outside investors no less favorably than na­
tionals , but for the purpose of some of such rules and regulations, 
differentiation in treatment is necessary. 
The country-specific exceptions schedules also play a role be­
yond limiting the reach of the national treatment and MFN obli­
gations. The schedules will serve as the framework for how fu­
ture liberalization will take place . The MAI, as drafted, allows 
countries to grandfather-in existing non-conforming measures, or  
any amendments to them that do not  increase the  non-conformity 
nomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach symposium sponsored by the 
American Society of International Law (" ASIL") (1 997) . 
186 The current proposal for General Exceptions in Section VI has only 
been proposed for d1scussion by the Chairman. !viAl Negotiating Text, supra 
note 8 .  
187 Two different proposals have been submitted on Regional Economic 
Integration Organizations. Neither is included in the draft text at this point. 
See id. 
m See id. There is one proposal for an Exception Clause for Cultural In­
dustries . It also has not been included in the draft text to date . See also Invest­
ment Talks Continue at OECD; iv!A! Now on Course for 1999 Completion, 1 5  
INT'L TRADE REP. 525 [hereinafter Investment Talks] (describing th.is impasse 
over the cultural industries and regional integration exceptions) . 
189 See Graham, supra note 1 58 ,  at 2 10  & n . 10  (noting that none of the 
countries of the OECD, which is certainly the group with the most liberal in­
vestment regimes, grant "full national treatment to all foreign controlled firms 
in aJJ industries") . 
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of the rneasure. 190 A decision has been unreached as to  whether to 
keeo this as a standsti l l  measure 1 9 1  that does not al low new non­
con
-'
forming measures to be issued by countries once the MAl goes 
into effect. If there is standstil l ,  then the next issue would logi­
cally be rollback, an indicator of how the exceptions list would 
shrink over time as countries adjust to the new liberalized in­
vestment regime. The MAl currently has chosen a method for 
rollback which requires countries to list any commitment to fu­
ture liberalization on the exceptions schedule itself. 1 92 Conduct­
ing rollback in this manner means that any commitments to re­
duce and el iminate non-conforming measures would be made at 
the time the MAl goes into force . In this respect , t he current 
MAI draft does not have one element of a GATT /'W'TO frame­
work agreement: the commitment to later rounds of negotiations 
concerning future l iberalization. The MAl, as drafted, has no 
provisions for successive rounds of negotiations, or  for monitor-
. f . . ' 1 "  1 93 mg o s1gnatones comp 1ance. 
Beyond the breadth issue, the MAl differs fro m  the existing 
\Y/TO agreements on investment in two ways that are bound to 
affect its consideration as a potential model for a comprehensive 
WTO investment agreement . The MAI covers not only the lib­
eralization of investment rules, but also investment protection. 
These provisions and the method used to ensure them in some 
ways appear to put the interests of investors in a privileged posi­
tion. The content of the provision on expropriation and adequate 
190 Jl.1A l Negotiating Text, supra note 8, at Section IX, A, which contains the 
following provision: 
a. Articles X (National Treatment) , Y (Most Favored Nation Treat­
ment) , [Article 2 , . . .  and Article . . .  ] do not apply to :  
(a) any existing non-conforming measure as set out by a contracting 
Party in its Schedule to Annex A of the Agr;;ement, to the extent that 
the measure is maintained, continued or promptly reserved in its legal 
system. 
1 9 1  The draft text reveals that the negotiators are sti l l  considering whether 
to allow new non-conforming measures to be introduced after the MAl comes 
into force. See id. , at X, (B) and (C). According to an explanatory note for this, 
there are two views. "[O]ne view 1s that such a provision might undermine the 
MAl disciplines to which it applied. The other view is that Part B would make 
it easier to preserve high standards in the disciplines of the agreement by allow­
ing flexibility to countries in lodging their exceptions." !d. 
192 See id. at X, Annex A ,  1 .  
193 These are the other methods that were discussed by  the negotiating 
group. See MAI Commentary (on file with author) .  
I 
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compensatiOn closely resembles the high standard set in 
NAFT A, 194 as does the provision on free. transfer of funds . 195 
Moreover1 th.e MAI drafters have specified c;;vo methods for dis­
pute resolution which are t raditional state w state procedure, and 
the more controversial investor versus host state arbitration. 
\Yfhile there is precedent for the investor I state dispute in bilateral 
investment <J.greements and NAFTA, including such a method in 
the W/TO rnigh1.: require extensive readjustment o.f that insritu-. .  } 1 .  • l " 1 .  , 
uon s t r2,Clrt: I ons regarc mg dispute settlement. 
T' .-. d·Y' "' t �' "'"' have heen o n ly pro l�O"''-' ] S ··· h (-'1 ' 7'  1--, o -.-, .  · ·_,-_ n �.xe;�t ,"' . . t U �- L '" )  - " H .. . C .\ • L.J • • •  r' ...o <• . O. L  j ,Ac 1A -ri - ' . .. � 
trade-related t:?cbor rules. This section of the article will therefore 
concentrate o rt exo laininE the three existing oroposals, and offer-.l u '-' J.. ...._ 
ing one ne w one.  This analysis is not offered as a prescription for 
what should be done or considered. Rather, attempting to set out 
what labor rights rules might look like seems necessary for reveal­
ing their amenability to trade-related rule-making. All  of the 
proposals have limitations that arise either from the nature of la­
bor rights themselves or from the institutional efforts that would 
be required to negotiate and enforce such rules. The proposals 
will be discussed in order of least complex (although not necessar­
ily the ieast feasible) to most complex. 
The first proposal , espoused by Steve Charnovitz, is to expand 
ILO competence to include the power to authorize trade controls. 
Charnovitz argues that the ILO organic act , the Treaty of Ver-
194 Compare NAFTA, supra note 135,  at art . 1 1 10, with MAl Negotiating 
Text, supra note 8, at IV.2. Both require that expropriation be direct or indirect 
or be by a measure having an equivalent effect . In addition, both give the same 
exceptions of public purpose and non-discriminating basis, in accordance with 
due process and accompanied by adequate compensation. The only major ele­
ment of the expropriation and compensation section that does not match 
NAFTA's is that there is currently no valuation criteria specified for the MAl's 
fair market value ("FMV") provision. Most of the countries did not want the 
kind of explicit options set out in NAFTA. However, in order to avoid possi­
ble uncertainty about the definitions of FMV, the Negotiating Group chairman 
has suggested that an interpretive note could be added so that "in the case of 
undue delay in the payment of compensation on the part of a Contracting 
Party, any exchange rate loss arising from this delay should be borne by the 
host country." MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 8,  at n.2. 
195 Compare NAFTA, supra note 133 ,  at art. 1 109, with MAl Negotiating 
Text, supra note 8, at IVA. 
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' 1 1  1 96 . . f . 1 97 1 h h ' f . TT 0 sat es, mteroretatwns o 1t ana t e . tstory o· several 1� 
conventions198
,
suggest that such power could be available .  Char­
novitz goes on to suggest that if the ILO were to claim such com­
petence, it could focus on drafting at least one new convention on 
forced labor that committed states not to trade in products made . . 1 . J h . 1 99 C h  . 
-- ' h.  
m vw atwn 01 t1 e convention. arnovttz argues tnat 1s sug-
gestion is for trade controls on odious products , particularlv if 
1 -r , -l • '00 ,I pre-approved by the ILO, rather t han trade sanctiOns . -
Several limitations exist with regard to this proposal . rirst, 
the ILO membership would have to approve any such ·�XF��nsion 
f . � . 1 II 0 1 • 1 ' 1 • I o tts pov,;ers. utven c t:e � mstory on traCle-rel a i:eo n g nts to 
d ' . 1 · ; 1 2o 1 S , . , l -
. 11 r . , ! ate, trus seems un! lKe.y.  , econa, even 1± po 1t1ca 1)1 , easw1e, a 
system of trade cont rols,  such as a total ban on the oJious prod-
, 1 b I 
. 1 • WTO . 202 ucts, wou10 e a t rade measure suo;ect to ... scn.1tmy. 
196 See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 1 ,  at art. 405. The treaty contains no 
limits for the scope of lLO Conventions. 
197 See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 160-6 1 .  198 See id. at 16 1 -62. 
199 See id. at 1 62 .  
200 See id. 
201 There have already been sharp objections to Director General­
Hansenne's proposal that the ILO adopt a declaration of  principle identifying 
core labor rights and a follow-up mechanism to review Member Stace compli­
ance. See supra note 10 .  
202 A trade ban ·would qualify as a quantitative restrict i on under Art . XI of 
the GATT. While it is true that a country could unilaterally deploy such a 
measure, there is always the possibil ity of a response by the target country. 
None of the GA TT's general exemptions would provide a defense if the target 
country took its case to the \"VTO's DisJ?ute Settlement Body . The only Arti­
cle XX exception that deals with labor 1s (e) , which allows a country to take 
measures relating to the products of prison labor. While an analo?y can be 
drawn to prison labor from some core rights, for example, forced laoor o r  ex­
ploitative child labor, that would not necessarily mean that the state us ing the 
ban would prevail . The GATT general exceptions have been construed stnctly. 
See generally Jan Klabbers, Jurisprudence of International Trade Law: A rticle XX 
ofGA TJ, 26] .  WORLD TRADE L. 63 (1992) .  It is, therefore, far from clear that 
any reasoning from analogy would be accepted when the wording of Art icle 
XX(e) itself is precise. A recent interpretation of Article XX by the first WTO 
Appellate Body panel repo rt also gives another reason to avoid relying upon 
An. XX as a defense. In the Reformulated Gas case, t he panel found a measure 
t hat fit a XX exception to be unavailable because it failed the test of the article's 
chapeau which states that: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not apo!ied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of unjustifiable d�scrimina­
tion between countries where l ike conditions prevail ,  or a disguised re­
striction on trade in goods, nothing in this Agreement shall be con-
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Third, the arg;ument assumes t hat the issue of trade-relatedness has 
been resolved i n  favor of those pushing labor rights . As estab­
lished earlier, there is no consensus on whether labor rights are 
related to trade . Finally, this proposal would be of tru e  value in 
protectinv. labor rights only if it covered ali core labor rights. In 
� • 0 ., . l rJ  1 • d ft"  1 r 1 that mstance, the ILO woUl-... nave to cons1der re rat m g  all ot we 
conventions dealing ';vith the core labor rights w equip them with 
' . '"1 h "  ' ' d  . . I . thlS power. .ivJ. o reover,  L 1s proposal vrouir reomre e1L1er rnom-
• · 1 --.,... --.. 203 · .- ' T · .\ , r .,.O ,..l ri C' 1--- � ·· ..-1··" l i 'u o r  " ll  ovp�· " S 1 n "  ot t t1"' d 0 s s�y�-ram T O l" re \. .1 !.1.0 -' J l,.. L ·,.... _..__,_. a.. \.... -'"J... ..._ a.J l ..... . ...- 1 1  _._ J .  �-- __..__ __,.___, .. .) "" ..... . _ -
· · J r� " r�-- r1.f · . .... , .. ,-; 1-, .. ., 'f G r - pd rn f' L\ cC'  . -.. · -:1 , :  -r" 204 111c '/', .ng �...o, H;-· · alft L ,. c.._;Od� .r . e� _cL"'" o .. " -.. j__,C: L l <' " l O A L .  
strued w prevent the  adopt io n  G r  enforcement by any number of  
rneasures . 
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 3 5  
I.L.M. 603 (1996) .  
This suggests that even i f  an art . X X  defense is available, a country must 
make efforts not to discriminate in how it applies a measure. For the purposes 
of Charnovitz's oroposal, that would mean that there would have to be some 
method for verlying all trading countries that used forced labor so as to apply 
the ban appropriately. 
203 In th is light, it is interesting to note the ILO's decision to consider at 
this year's Internat ional Labor Conference setting up a "follow-up" mechanism 
to check whether countries are providing the core labor rights. See supra note 
10. It is not clear whether th is would actually be monitoring by the ILO, it 
may be a complaint procedure. See infra note 204. 
20 1 There is reason to bel ieve that the �roposed follow-up supervision, cur­rently being pro p os ed by Director-General Hansenne, is based o n  his 1997 re­
port suggestion that the Freedom of Association process be expanded. If a dec­
laration of principles estabiishing core labor riphts was adopted, which required 
that all ILO Member states had to adhere to tne rights as a membership obliga­
tion, then review could be done as it is under the Freedom of Associauon proc­
ess. 
[U]nder this special procedure, governments or workers' and employ­
ers' organizations may submit complaints concerning violations of 
trade union rights by States, irrespective of whether or not they have 
ratified the Conventions on freedom of association. These complaints 
are examined by the Committee on Freedom of Association, a tripar­
tite body of the Governing Body with an independent Chairperson. 
The Committee carries out a preliminary examination of the com� 
plaints taking into account the observations submitted by the govern­
ments. It may recommend to the Governing Body, as appropriate: 
that a case requires no further examination; that it should draw the at� 
tention of the government concerned to the problems that have been 
identified and invite it to resolve them; or  attempt to obtain the 
agre�rnent _of �he governme�t. c�ncerned fo: t�e case, 
t_o be referred to 
the .t<act-Fmdmg and ConClhatlOn Comrmss10n, wrt1ch would be a 
much more cumbersome procedure which is used sparingly. 
1997 Director-General Report, supra note 7, at 9.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
688 U. Pa. ]. Int 'l Econ. L. [Vol 19 :2 
h . 1 1 "b ?Q5 • T e second proposa , suggestea y one country,- vanous 
scholars/06 and international labor unions/07 has been to establish 
a collaborative ILO/WTO process. Not all of the proposals are 
exactly the same. What follows is a summary of the major ele­
ments of the proposals. The first ILO/\X'TO col laboration pro­
posal would involve the ILO and WTO act ing together as the 
screening body for complaints about violations of core labor 
rights. 1f rhe complaint process used by the ILO/\r?TO Joint 
d . c . i ' h 1 • 1 1 . A v1sory o m rmttee 1eaas to t e concmswn mat t 1ere -were VlO-, . h ., • I "I • c . • d 1 • J 708 k l�ttwns, t e j omt J\.av 1sory ..., omrr11ttee woul tLtlmately- rna e 
d . 1 ·w"T' 0 r . ' r . , . r recommen atl o ns -co tD.e . l ·- ·'-'ouncH r o r  cons1d.erat10n o� pos-
sible trade measures . A second variation on this scheme, sug-
--- -----· ___ __ ___ ___ .. _____ _ 
Director-Genera! Hansenne believes that such a procedure could be effec-
tive. In describing the Freedom of Association process, he notes the following: 
!d. 
Since it was set up in 1 95 1 ,  the Committee has examined more than 
1 ,900 cases, which has enabled it to build up a very full body of  princi­
ples on freedom of association and collective bargaining, based on the 
provisions of the ILO Constitution and the relevant Conventions, 
Recommendations and resolutions, and to take action which, even in 
the eyes of the outside world, is considered "reasonably effective. "  
Even i f  the  Freedom of Association process were expanded to  cover core 
rights by the ILO, it would not actually provide a way of verifying, for the 
purposes of applying a trade ban, which countries were not in compliance. 
Th�s kind of process relies on parties submitt �ng compl_aints rat�er than moni­
tonng. See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at b8-60, wh1ch contams the follow­
ing criticisms of the ILO Freedom of Association process: (1)  since the system 
is complaint driven, it does not reach countries where unions have no power to 
complain; (2) the Freedom of Association Committee does not properly distin-
9uish between major and minor problems; and (3) even if the Committee makes 
tindings, it does not publicize them widely. 
205 France suggested such a possibility in 1996. See Paul Waer, Social 
Clauses in International Trade, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 25,  3 3  (1996) . 
206 See Daniel S. Ehrenberg, From Intention to A ction: A n  ILO­
GA ITIWTO Enforcement Regime in International Labor R ights, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 63 (Lance A. Compa 
& Stefhen F. Diamond eds . ,  1996) ; Leary, supra note 7, at 1 92-97, 202. 20 See Leary, supra note 7, at 202-03 (describing the proposal by the In-
ternational Confederation of Free Trade Unions ("ICFTU") , the World Con­
federation of Labour ("WCL") , and the European Trade Union Conference 
("ETUC")) . 
208 The labor union proposal does not contemplate that trade sanctions 
would be the first response. Instead, if violations were found, the Joint Advi­
sory Committee would be charged with recommending measures to be taken 
within a certain time frame. Only if the country failed to take action would 
trade sanctions be applied. Jd. (quoting the ICFTU, WCL and ETUC pro-
!\ . posa J · 
I 
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£ested by a 1 99 5  ILO \X' orking Paper on "The Social Dimensions 
;f \V' orld Trade,"209 argues that adhering to core labor rights 
could be adopted as membership requirements for the WTO. If 2. 
\X/TO member then violated these rights it would be  subject to 
dispute settlement under Art. XXIII of the GATT under the con� 
cept of nullification and impairment.2 1 0  A third variation on the 
collaborative idea is based on using the WTO 's D ispute Settle­
ment Understanding ("DSU") . Under this proposal , the ILO 
'Nould accept complaints \oy an ILO o r  \Y/TO member state or an 'I l k ) • . ( 1 \ � " emp t oyers or wor _ers assoCiatiOn r r o m  sucn a state; about ::1 
� -., .. . t o-r c- � d P . r � ; r � <' ,.-.. f j 'b - . ;o-J-. ' ; r, l  t ; ,... . , " O d [ l, ·� l  n. 0 ,  b" O.:>S d. ll p �rSlStent P·  ac c , �,.J v l  . a  O J  r lb�lLS V;_u_  a .. .tvn:>. 
� 1 1 . . TT 0/WTO . 1 • h ' . l 1 ' ·- A J 01Dt l. k.J  committee wou ld L en decwe on ute ad-
missibil ity of complaints . If found admissible, a complaint would 
then be submitted to a joint ILO/W'TO Dispute Panel which 
would issue a report . As a final step, an offending state would be­
come subject to an ILO remediation committee established to de­
termine what corrective measures should be taken, a timetable for 
the state' s  response and a timetable  for possible sanctions if the 
d 'd  1 2 1 2  state 1 not comp y .  
N1ost, if  not all ,  of  t hese proposals are based on the assump­
tions that there is a clearly established universe of core labor 
rights, that there is a consensus on whether labor rights are re­
lated enough to trade to command WTO participation, and that 
ILO and WTO collaboration is politically achievable or practi� 
cally feasible .  As this article suggests, the first two assumptions 
are far from clear. With regard to ILO/WTO collaboration for 
such an effort to occur, there would have to be a major shift in 
the GATT /WTO t radition of standing alone. Although the 
Uruguay Round ended with suggestions that the WTO coordi-
709 - See supra note 7. 
2 1 0  See GATT, supra note 2, at art. XXIII, l (a) ; see also Leary, supra note 7, 
at 194-96. Actually, this is one of the three proposals suggested by the Social 
Dimensions Report . The other two proposals (1) making low labor standards a 
subsidy under GATT article XVI; or (2) extending GATT article XX on gen­
eral exceptions to cover labor  rights, were considered ill-founded. Both were 
objected to because either would allow a WTO Member to make a unilateral 
determination of when to take action against a trading partner. See Leary, supra 
note 7, at 202. 2 1 1  !d. a t  1 67. 
212 See Ehrenberg, supra note 206, at 167-75 . Ehrenberg 's proposal for 
ILO/WTO collaboration tracks all of the major aspects of the DSU System, 
including panel reports, negative consensus, and appeal (only this is to the ICJ 
instead of the Appellate Body) . 
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nate with other international organizations, the \X/TO has not yet 
done much in this resoect . 
The two other pr�posals would give jurisdiGion to ·t:he 'VvTO 
rather than the ILO . One possibility would be fo r the \VTO to 
adopt a l ist of core rights as general exceptions to GATT obliga­
tions. This -.vould require amending Article XX so that products 
made in viol at ion of core labor rights were treated like products 
made from prison labor. Another possibility would be the 
oromulgation of a 'YITO Trade-Related Labor Ris:hts ("TRLR") 
� l '  ' . ' . 
d 2 1 3  . u 1 
. 1 i\ greerner1t 1rd\.ed to c�aeie 1n goo s .  Assun11 rlg -�:r:at ;u_1)r StlCrt 
. • .  . 1 ]  'b l  . 1 J  r J-. 1 ' . agree ment 1s e'uer pol !t iC:alq poss1 e, 1t wotli roc1_ts o n  esta,�· l lsh-. h • • l I d d t' ( • ., r� l 1ng L e rm m mum l a b o r  stan ar s necessary or r a .t r  t rao.e . l .tv�re 
is a model for such a treaty in the TRIPS Agreu:nen t . 2 1 4  Any 
TRLR Agreement would have to have a sect ion on minirrlUm 
standards, which are based upon core labor rights around which a 
consensus appears to exist, as well as a section on domestic en­
forcement measures . A TRLR A greement could be made subject 
to the existing DSU, as was the TRIPS A greement . However, in 
t his instance, there is a serious problem created by only states hav­
ing access to dispute settlement. Workers in a state not providing 
such rights would have to rely upon other states to pursue their 
cause . 
The \XITO-based p roposals suffer from many of the problems 
pointed out with regard to the other proposals .  FirsT:, they as­
sume that any negotiations would begin with a l ist of well-defined 
core labor rights as the minimum standards. The ILO does have 
conventions on all the core rights, but they would need �o be re­
drafted from a WTO perspective; at least with regard to the pro­
hibition of exploitative child labor, some complete definition 
would first have to be developed. Second, such proposals would 
never be considered without some understanding of trade­
relatedness which currently does not exist . Finally, it is not clear 
that such an agreement w ould really improve labor conditions in 
errant WTO 1vlember states. A large measure of the TRIPS 
Agreement's  value as a model for future trade-related rule-making 
remains unrealized. It is one thing to establish minimum interna-
2 1 3  Any such agreement would have to be linked to trade and good<> in or­
der to satisfy the basic requirement of trade-relatedness. Besides, the core labor 
standards are important precisely because they would establish a minimal level 
of acceptability for products produced by workers. 
214  See supra Sections 1 . 1 . 1 .  and note 21 (discussing the TRlPS Agreement) . 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/13
1998] L!NKA GE A ND R ULE-MAKING 69 1 
tional standards , as arguably the TRIPS and any TRLR Agree­
ment could do. It is yet another thing to ensure that the Member 
states enforce those minimum standards. Since the transition oe-
. d f �n '" nS ' f h ' l · · ? ! � · no �or 1 rd lJ nas not yet run or t e deve opmg countnes , - 1t 
is impossible to judge whether they can or will comply . Thor­
ough complia_nce under TRIPS may not be achieved unless other ' , r h 'v'"'Q ' --1 " 1 .states mal\:e trc:quent use or t1 e w 1 s utspute sett1ement sys-
2 1 6  t �:fl.t . 
J. DISPUTED GOALS/GAINS/INSTITUTIONS 
-�· • J f 
. . 1 ' 1 • l he actors m me p rocess o mternatwna. rule--ma Kmg are 
rnany:  governments, inter-governmental organizations, regional 
c-rg8.mzations and economic integration arrangements , non­
governmental organizations and interest groups, the affected con­
stituencies, and scholars . States, behaving as unitary actors and 
acting stra'tegically/ 17 are not the only, or even necessarily, the 
driving force behind rule-making. The ongoing debate regarding 
linkages is symptomatic of a world having to come to grips with 
"giobalization and its discontents."2 1 8  While institutions provide 
a forum in which rule-making takes place, the cooperation and 
coordination within that institution and its traditions and/ or 
process for rule-making change the nature of rules adopted. 
Moreover, as the process of rule-making proceeds, through the 
consensus levels suggested above, the goals of some if not all of 
the actors can change. Given the nature of the arguments for 
2 15  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3,  at arts. 65-66. The developing 
countries and countnes in transition from a centrally planned economy were 
given five years from the time the WTO Agreement went into effect (1995) to 
meet TRIPS obligations. See id. art . 65 .2. Least developed countries were given 
eleven years. See id. art. 66. 
216 In the earliest tests of developing country compliance, the United States 
brought cases under the DSU against both Ind1a and Pakistan for their failure 
to set up "mail boxes" during the TRIPS transition period. The mail boxes, to 
receive patent applications, were required because under TRIPS art. 65(4), de­
veloping countnes were given an additional five year period to extend patent 
protection to areas of technology that had been previously unpatentable under 
their laws. India lost before the dispute settlement panel and appealed. 
2 17 These ideas, about states, represent structural realist assumptions about 
how the world works. See Anthony Clark Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? In­
ternational Rules and International Politics, 3 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 1 12 (1998) . 
2 1 8  See Langille, supra note 7 ,  at  29. 
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l in kage and the wide variety of l inkages being argued for such as 
trade and environment, trade and labor rights , trade and invest­
ment , trade and competition law, trade and anti-corruption the 
goals of some groups wil l  be altered by the linkages ultimately ac-
, ? J 9 [ d 1 d ' k "  d d T • 
• 
ceptea- 1 0 r  tra e-re ate rule-rna mg an acte l upon. 1t 1s Sl ill-
plistic to argue that developed countries alone are pushing cen:a.in 
agendas only for the strategic advantage of protectionisr.n) al­
though, both trade and labor rights and trade and investment do 
qual ify,  in some aspects ,  as developed-country issues in this r�-
�. · · · i 1 b · 1 r ] " i j s oect .  c, haractenzmg tne aGvocacy ! e1n� done tor tlnKa ,�e anc 1 .._.. <.J 0 l ., : 1 1 · · h r ; · i t rac.e-re ! ::J.teo n.11e-maK1ng 1n  sue a narrow rasnwn, n o w e-...r,.-:; r ,  re-
• • 1 h . L L qu1res o n e:  to 1gnore tne _ Iuman nguts concerns many groups : t 1Vs 
2 19  
An illustration of th is came from the OECD's process for negotiat ing 
the Ml\I. Arter a text on the core mvestment rights and prmcctions ,·.-as 
drafted, the OECD consulted with non-governmental organizations, p;;m�cu­
larly environmental groups. This interaction led the MAI Negotiating Groupo: 
to consider some of the Issues they raised about l inkage. The MAI draft text 
now contains two alternative proposals on "Not Lowering Standards" which 
read as follows: 
Alternative 1 
The Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage investment 
by iowering [domestic] health, safety or environmental [standards] 
[measures] or relaxing [domest ic] [core] labour standards. Accordingly, 
a Party should not waive or otherwise deropate from, or offer to wa;.ve 
or otherwise derogate from,  such [standards] [measures] as an encour­
agement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in 
its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that 
another Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request co n­
sultations with the other Partv and the two Parties shall consult with a 
view to avoiding any such encouragement. 
Alternative 2 
A Contracting Party [shall] [should] not w2.ive or otherwise derol!ate 
from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from [domestic] health, 
safety or environmental [measures] [standards] or [domestic] [core] la­
bour standards as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion or retention of an mvestment of an investor. 
MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 8, at 50. 
The MAI draft, therefore, has apparently accepted a l inkage, at some level, 
between investment and the environment, and between investment and labor. 
See Investment Talks, supra note 1 88 .  In addition, the delegations have been con­
sidering an "additional clause" on labor and environment. The form of that 
clause, 1f adopted, has not yet been determined. Among those forms officialiy 
proposed by delegations, one would involve a variation of GATT Art. XX lan­
guage and another would be based on NAFTA Chapter l l 's provision (Art. 
1 1 14(1)) on not lowering standards. See id. 
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regarding core labor rights220 and the developmental interests ex­
pressed by !:].On-governmental organizations concerning trade and . L2 1 mvestment. 
4. 2 . What Gains? 
What exactly would be the gains to the States and all the other 
actors of the international community from the creation of inter­
national trade-related rules fo r  labor and investment rights? It is 
not possible to catalogue all of the suggested gains from the two 
linkages examined in this article.  Nevertheless, it is possible w 
identify some gains from the protection of core labor rights: 
moral (from the promotion of human dignity by protecting core 
labor r��lts) ; _ �he_ �ong term economic inte:ests of the s�ate in-volved; _ _ _  and legmmacy (for the world tradmg system as 1t grap-
ples with the growing arguments that economic gains are not the 
only value) . For investment rights, examples of some gains would 
be facilitating investment, trade, and business by providing some 
measure of certainty I stability in the rules (rule coherence) ;  and 
contributing at some level to the economic growth and potential 
development for all countries. 
4. 3. Which Institution ? 
Given the process-oriented focus of this article, any profitable 
institutional discussion should be l imited to analyzing the existing 
alternatives. Consequently, what fol lows will  be a short summary 
of the advantages and disadvantages of the institutions currently in 
play. In the investment area, the two institutions are t he OECD 
and the WTO. The OECD advantages would appear to be that it 
has been negotiated by a group of countries with similar interests 
and goals, which may be able to come up with a coherent set of 
220 See supra nn.26, 1 1 9-20 and accompanying text. 
221 See Investment TaLks, supra note 1 8 8  (describing how the MAI negotiat­
ing group adopted a provision on Not Lowering Standards (see supra n.219) in 
response to reactions from environmental groups and labor unions) . 
222 See Langille, supra note 7, at 39.  
There is  really no interesting economic argument as to whether it is in 
a nation's long-term interest to pursue polices of utilizing child labour, 
forced labour, or discrimination in the labour market. It is not. The 
only economic issues here are difficult issues of transition from current 
conditions to a better world. 
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rules representing those views . Since the OECD will be a stand­
alone treaty, other countries will have the freedom to accede if they 
believe, or later,  obtain evidence that it would be in their best inter­
ests. During the drafting process itself, the OECD Secretariat has 
made efforts to educate non-OECD States J.bout the 1v1AI's goals 
and its scope .  Since there are no olans to create an institutional 
d h ""· If 1\ I  ·n:� l 
l 
' 1 ft 1 • structure aroun t _e lvlH ,-- at teas i n o t  as currently era, ea, 1t can 
easilv deal with the establishment of ;:;. t\\'O··track disDute senlement 
; 0 " l  
d 
0 0 1 . 0 • ' '.f 
� 
system bu1 t aroun mternatwna1 arbttran on.--
The advantages of the 'WTO as the institution for international 
investment rule-making, is char it is a global organization. Any 
1 • ' · 11 . d  . , ' Th ru1es 1t adopts w1 represent a w1 1er, 1 t not: deeper, conse nsus . 1 e 
','l "T ,-, I ' h . ' .( h V/ 1 \_� nas the aut onty to make any agreernent part 01 L.e mem-
bership obligation of the organizations,  if the 1-.1ember states so 
choose . The GATT /WTO process of rule-making in negotiating 
rounds creates the possibility of other agenda items that can be 
t raded off to gain an i nvestment agreement or  an i nvestment 
agreement with a particular level of standards. Finally, WTO has 
had historical experience with drafting framework agreements that 
have proven successful over time. 
The disadvantages of the two institutions involved are reverse 
images of the advantages of the other. For example, since the :WIAI 
is not being negotiated by a global group , any OECD set of rules 
will not ref1ect the consideration and potential accommodation of 
the views of developing countries. Given the l imited OECD 
membership and the content of the MAI, it may have difficulty get-
223 Th"  h b . d . h . . _ ts as een an tssue unng t,.e negotlatwns. 
The Parties Group will come into operation when the NL'\I comes 
inw force. There is still some uncertainty about its character. Some 
see the MAI as simply a framework of rights and obligations together 
with a procedure for settlement of disputes. The Parties Group would 
therefore concentrate on the important task of handling new acces­
sions. Others see the Pai"ties Group as a new institution to act as a fo­
rum for debate and for canyina forward a wider policy agenda. In 
practice, it is probable that its character will evolve to suit the actual 
tuture needs of WlAI members .  
Statement of Nick Griffiths, U.K.  Permanent Delegation to the OECD (on file 
with author) .  
224 See JWA! Negotiating Text, supra note 8 at Section V -Dispute Settle­
ment, State-State Procedures and Investor-State Procedures. The dispute set­
tlement section is still undergoing further elaboration. According to explana­
tory notes �different options remain in the field of multilateral consultations 
and scope ot d1spute settlement."  I d. at n . l .  
f 
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ring other nations to accede. In the case of the V{TTO, one per­
ceived disadvantage, but not a necessarily a universal ly held one, 
could be chat the global membership wil l  adopt a less amb itious set 
of investment rules . Consequently, l iberalization wil l  take longer. 
The WTO would also have to grapple with what to do with the is·  
r 1 • 1 · 225 sue or <11spute reso ut1on. 
In th; case of t rade-labor rights, the two institutions are ::he 
0 I 1 "IVT"'O T • 
• ' h. r • IL anci the <.v 1 . 1t IS 1mponant to note here t at none ot the 
discuss ions about international competence >egard inv. trade-relcrced 
<i 
• j 1 • ' T�r . ' • l 0• 1 2?.6 L<bor n gnts nave imagmed the 1LO gomg on as 1t nas 1 !1 t !le pa.5t. 
• h ! • • 
b l Tl 0 ' l ' . • As a result ,  t 1e Qiscussions a out tne 1 � s ac.va.mages relace rc; ! ts 
inherent: strengths. The ILO advantages are t hat it i;· a.n institution 
d d ' ,  . J t 
• 
, ., 1 • h ' <  ,evoteL t o  l a b o r  1ssues ana tne promotiOn ot la. b o r  n g1 t s .  ['/Ioreo-
, TLO' . . 1 h '  1 ., ; v e r ,  tne . .. s tnparnte memoers .tp stnJcture actually means tnat 
] , 1 L . b h . 1 .abor,  thro u gn representatwn y L e unwns ana managernent, 
through representation of that group, each has a voice in the nego­
tiations and deliberations of the organization. Both of these aspects 
together make the institution sensitive to the human rights and 
commercial aspects of trade-related labor rights. 
The WTO may or may not have any advantages acting as the 
sole competent institution in this area over the ILO. ivlost of the 
pro oosa ls made for trade-related labor rights .involve the w·To and 
Lo
l 
k '  . ll b . r ?77 �1 -vr�o . I woL mg m some co a oratlve rorm.-- 1 ne vv 1 , however, 
has taken over jurisdiction from another function specific organiza­
tion, \X!IPO, for the purposes of developing trade-related rules . As 
a result, there is precedent for such a step. 
The disadvantage of sole ILO jurisdiction appears to be limited 
powers of ensuring compliance . The ILO tradition of voluntarism 
has ,  in the views of many, left core labor rights at substantial risk. 
Nevenheless, there are equally serious concerns about turning to 
the '�/TO, whether it stands alone or acts in some collaborative ef­
fon, solely to obtain the rules compliance power that would come 
from \VTO authorized trade sanctions since labor has two aspects 
(involving human rights and its role as a factor of production) . In 
275 d . - See supra notes 154-55 an accompanytng text. 
226 Currently, the constituencies pushing such a view are the most outspo­
ken of the developing countries. See supra note 10 . Director-General Hansenne 
has been signaling hts strong belief that some alteration and expansion of the 
ILO role regarding core labor rights is needed. See id. ; see also supra note 204 
(discussing the limttations of the most active ILO process) . 
227 
The only exceptions are the Charnovitz proposal, which does raise 
trade issues, and the TRLR proposal which was made largely to reveal its limits. 
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the near term It 1s the ILO which must struggle with linkage. 
\JV'hatever happens in the next phase of ILO negotiations and dis­
cussi ons the issue of l inkage is unlikely to disappear. 
• 
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